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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES AND REGULATORY
OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATE CLIMATE
POLICY INNOVATION
Felix Mormann*
This Article explores constitutional limits and regulatory openings for innovative state
policies to mitigate climate change by promoting climate-friendly, renewable energy. In the
absence of a comprehensive federal policy approach to climate change and clean energy, more
and more states are stepping in to fill the policy void. Already, nearly thirty states have
adopted renewable portfolio standards that create markets for solar, wind, and other clean
electricity. To help populate these markets, a few pioneering states have recently started using
feed-in tariffs that offer eligible generators above-market rates for their clean, renewable
power.
But renewable portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs, and other state climate policies have
increasingly come under attack for alleged violations of the Constitution. How much latitude
do states have when they experiment with innovative climate and clean energy policies? And
which policy best protects states from the risk of lengthy and costly litigation over its
constitutionality?
To answer these crucial questions, this Article takes stock of recent litigation challenging
the constitutionality of state renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs. Qualitative
analysis reveals markedly different constitutional risk profiles for both policies with portfolio
standards more prone to Commerce Clause challenges and feed-in tariffs more likely to face
Supremacy Clause challenges. These vulnerabilities have prompted widespread scholarly skep-
ticism over both policies’ constitutional viability when implemented at the state level, often
accompanied by calls for sweeping legislative or judicial reform. Pushing back against the
prevailing scholarly skepticism, this Article draws on recent precedent to make the case for joint
implementation of both policies as a way to reduce, rather than exacerbate, a state’s overall
exposure to the risk of constitutional attacks on its climate and clean energy policy.
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INTRODUCTION
In the absence of a comprehensive federal policy approach to climate
change and clean energy, states are increasingly stepping in to fill the policy
void.1 Already, twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S.
territories have adopted renewable portfolio standards2 that create markets for
low-carbon, renewable energy by requiring electric utilities to meet a portion of
1. For an overview of state climate policy action, see Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach,
Micro-Motives and State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
119, 123 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 883 (2008); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global
Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 683 (2008); see
also Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621 (2015) (exploring the
ideal institutional level of implementation for select climate and clean energy policies).
2. Renewable portfolio standards, also known as a renewable targets or quota obligations, set
quotas that require electric utility companies to source a certain share of the electricity they
sell to end-users from renewable sources of energy. See infra notes 42–47 and accompanying R
text.
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their sales with solar, wind, and other renewables.3 Meanwhile, a few pioneer-
ing states have recently begun to experiment with feed-in tariff4 policies that
pay renewable power generators above-market rates designed to cover the
higher generation costs of emerging renewable energy technologies.5
The Obama Administration’s recently finalized Clean Power Plan6 further
increases U.S. dependence on state-level policy action to mitigate global climate
change and promote clean energy.7 Born out of frustration with partisan dead-
lock in Congress, the Clean Power Plan draws on the Clean Air Act’s model of
cooperative federalism8 to task state policymakers and regulators with achieving
nationwide reductions in carbon emissions that drive global warming and cli-
3. See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. (2015), https://
perma.cc/B73L-ZKTT. Eight more states and one U.S. territory have adopted nonbinding
goals for the deployment of renewables. See id. For a discussion of the history and political
background of state renewable portfolio standards, see Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The
Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y 10 (2007). For more information on the design and implementation characteristics of
renewable portfolio standards, see infra Part I.
4. Feed-in tariffs are two-pronged policies that guarantee renewable power generators access to
their local power grid and require local electric utilities to purchase the power output of these
generators at above-market rates. See infra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. The policy’s R
misleading name (it does not impose any tariff on electricity imports or other related activi-
ties) is thought to be a tribute to an overly literal translation of its implementation in Ger-
many as per the 1991 Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (Electricity Feed-in Law). See Paul Gipe,
Frequently Asked Questions About Feed-in Tariffs, Advanced Renewable Tariffs, and Renewable
Energy Payments, WIND-WORKS.ORG (Oct. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/S3HA-DECB.
5. Early adopters of feed-in tariffs at the state level include California, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See infra notes 59–65. Other state legislatures, R
such as Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin, have
recently debated proposals for feed-in tariffs. See H.B. 5855 (IL 2008); H.B. 1374 (IN
2014); H.B. 408 (KY 2010); H.B. 5218 (MI 2007); H.B. 4137 (MI 2009); H.F. 3537 (MN
2008); S.B. 4862 (NY 2011); A.B. 649 (WI 2010). For more information on the design and
implementation characteristics of feed-in tariffs, see infra Part I.
6. See Final Rule: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units [hereinafter “Clean Power Plan”], 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct.
23, 2015). See also Final Rule: Standards for Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for
New Power Stationary Sources: Electric Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23,
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
7. See, e.g., Clean Power Plan, supra note 6 at 64,664 (“States will play a key role in ensuring R
the emissions reductions are achieved at a reasonable cost.”). See also id. at 64,665 (“[T]he
final guidelines are designed to build on and reinforce progress by states . . . .”).
8. See id. (“CAA section 111(d) relies on the well-established state-EPA partnership to accom-
plish the required CO2 emission reductions.”). See also William W. Buzbee, Assymetrical
Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547,
1564 (2007) (discussing cooperative federalism and regulatory floors in the context of envi-
ronmental law); Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial
Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 330–331
(2013) (offering an overview of cooperative federalism structure and sources).
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mate change.9 One of the Plan’s three building blocks expressly calls for replac-
ing carbon-intensive fossil fuel-fired power plants with new, zero-emitting
solar, wind, and other renewable energy generating capacity.10 However critics
and scholars may feel about the Clean Power Plan’s methodology11 and legal-
ity,12 it has already added further momentum to the proliferation of state policy
action to promote clean energy and mitigate climate change.13
The December 2015 Paris climate agreement provides additional support
for the trend toward state policy responses to the challenges posed by global
climate change.14 At the heart of the agreement lies the call for “Nationally
9. The Clean Power Plan establishes CO2 performance rates for affected fossil fuel-fired power
plants, translates these rates into state-specific CO2 emission goals, and requires states to
submit and implement plans to achieve their respective carbon goals. Performance rates and,
hence, state-specific carbon goals, are determined based on the newly introduced “Best Sys-
tem of Emissions Reduction” comprised of three building blocks. See Clean Power Plan,
supra note 6 at 64,666–67. R
10. While the Clean Power Plan lacks a comprehensive definition of renewable energy, the final
rule provides that states adopting a rate-based approach may issue emission rate credits
(“ERCs”) to “renewable electric generating technologies using . . . [w]ind, solar, geothermal,
hydro, wave, tidal.” Id. at 64,950. The other two building blocks call for improving the heat
rate and, hence, efficiency of affected coal-fired steam plants and for replacing electricity
generation from higher-emitting steam generating plants with power generated from lower-
emitting existing natural gas power plants. See id. at 64,667.
11. For a sample of the burgeoning scholarly literature discussing the Clean Power Plan, see,
e.g., Tomas Carbonell, EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan: Protecting Climate and Public
Health by Reducing Carbon Pollution from the U.S. Power Sector, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
403 (2015); Emily Hammond & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Clean Power Plan: Testing the
Limits of Administrative Law and the Electric Grid, 7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L.
1 (2016); Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Regional Energy Governance Under the
Clean Power Plan, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143 (2016).
12. Within twelve hours of the final rule’s publication in the federal register, the Clean Power
Plan became the most heavily litigated environmental regulation ever. See Emily Holden &
Rod Kuckro, The Fate of the Obama Adminstration’s Signature Climate Change Rule Is in the
Hands of the Courts, E&E PUBLISHING, https://perma.cc/843Z-RRJ6. The Supreme Court
recently stayed the Clean Power Plan’s implementation until resolution of pending chal-
lenges. See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016). As this Article is going to print,
President Donald Trump has “vowed to kill the Clean Power Plan,” but the large number of
intervenors on behalf of EPA in defense of the Plan suggests that the agency’s withdrawal
from the suit would not be sufficient for the Clean Power Plan’s opponents to win. See
Chelsea Harvey, Trump Has Vowed to Kill the Clean Power Plan. Here’s How He Might—And
Might Not—Succeed, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/PE49-KYRR.
13. Cf. Michael Wara, A Bad Day for U.S. Energy and Climate Policy, STAN. L. SCH. LEGAL
AGGREGATE (Feb. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/8352-4EGH (noting that the U.S. electric-
ity industry has already begun the work of planning for compliance with the Clean Power
Plan’s requirements).
14. See Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. DOC.
FCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Dec. 12, 2015), https://perma.cc/DS9K-M28X. The Paris agreement
entered into force on November 4, 2016, less than a year after its adoption, following ratifi-
cation by 55 countries accounting for at least 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions, in-
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Defined Contributions” by the parties to mitigate climate change. Recent
scholarship acknowledges that, in the absence of Congressional action, the
Clean Power Plan and the state policy action prescribed thereunder form a
crucial part of the U.S. plan to meet its international commitments under the
Paris agreement.15
Ironically, the Clean Power Plan and the Paris climate agreement order
state policymakers and regulators to the frontlines of the war on carbon at a
time when state-level renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”), feed-in tariffs
(“FITs”), and other innovative state climate and clean energy policies16 have
come under attack for alleged violations of the Constitution. Since 2010, sev-
eral states, including California,17 Colorado,18 Delaware,19 Massachussetts,20
Minnesota,21 and Missouri22 have had to defend their renewable portfolio stan-
dards against constitutional attacks, primarily based on Commerce Clause chal-
lenges. Despite their relative novelty, state feed-in tariffs, too, have already
become subject to legal attacks as illustrated by the prolonged litigation over the
feed-in tariff programs of California23 and Vermont.24
cluding the United States. See Paris Accord – Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://perma.cc/5VEF-A8W9.
15. See Wiseman & Osofsky, supra note 11, at 1. In contrast to his continued opposition to the R
Clean Power Plan, President Donald Trump has an “open mind” regarding U.S. involve-
ment in the Paris agreement and its commitment to combat global climate change. See Oli-
ver Milman, Paris Climate Deal: Donald Trump Says He Now Has an ‘Open Mind’ About
Accord, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/3SCH-YRAK.
16. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013)
(rejecting dormant Commerce Clause challenges against California’s Low Carbon Fuel
Standard), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
17. See Order Denying Applications for Rehearing of Decision 11-12-052, Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n (Nov. 1, 2013), https://perma.cc/L3LS-DPJX.
18. See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (D. Colo. 2014) (denying
claims that Colorado’s RPS violates the dormant Commerce Clause), aff’d, 793 F.3d 1169
(10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015).
19. See Nichols v. Markell, No. 12-777-CJB, 2014 WL 1509780 (D. Del. Apr. 17, 2014) (chal-
lenging Delaware’s RPS program on Commerce Clause grounds for limiting qualifying fuel
cells to those from in-state manufacturers).
20. See All. to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 959 N.E.2d. 413, 422
(Mass. 2011) (describing the constitutional challenges that eventually led to the elimination
of certain in-state preferences in the Massachussetts RPS).
21. See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 916, 919 (D. Minn. 2014) (holding
Minnesota’s New Energy Act in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause insofar as it
sought to control the conduct of out-of state entities), aff’d, North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825
F.3d 912, 923 (8th Cir. 2016).
22. See State, ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 386 S.W.3d 165,
175 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
23. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (July 15, 2010) (order on petitions for
declaratory order); Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 133 FERC ¶ 61,059 (Oct. 20, 2010) (order
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How much latitude do states have when they seek to craft innovative cli-
mate and clean energy policies? And which policy best protects states from the
risk of lengthy and costly litigation over its constitutionality? In its quest for
answers to these crucial questions, this Article makes three distinct contribu-
tions to the literature on climate and clean energy law and policy. First, it offers
a systematic account of recent litigation challenging the constitutionality of
state renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs that uses the heterogene-
ity among plantiffs to illustrate the diverse political economy factors barring
more decisive policy action. Second, the Article develops and compares the
unique constitutional risk profiles and resulting vulnerabilities of state-level
portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs. Third, the Article draws on recent pre-
cedent to develop an innovative policy strategy that allows state policymakers to
simultaneously promote global environmental and local economic benefits
while minimizing the vulnerability to constitutional attacks.
Notwithstanding their shared objectives, state renewable portfolio stan-
dards and feed-in tariffs exhibit markedly different vulnerabilities to constitu-
tional challenges. As state policymakers seek to internalize the job creation, tax
revenue, and other economic benefits associated with renewable energy deploy-
ment, they often incorporate in-state location requirements and preferences
into their renewable portfolio standards. Such economic parochialism is neither
new nor unique to the energy space25 and may, ultimately, serve to promote
global public goods.26 In the context of clean energy deployment, however, it
threatens the long-term viability of a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to mitigate
anthropogenic climate change. With their discriminatory effect on interstate
commerce, in-state location requirements and other geographic preferences
render state renewable portfolio standards vulnerable to dormant Commerce
Clause challenges.27
granting clarification and dismissing rehearing), reh’g denied, 134 FERC ¶ 61,044 (Jan. 20,
2011).
24. See Otter Creek Solar, 143 FERC ¶ 61,282 (June 27, 2013), reh’g denied, 146 FERC ¶
61,192 (Mar. 20, 2014).
25. Policymakers at all levels of government try to internalize the economic benefits of their
economic development programs. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Mayor
& Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (municipal ordinance requiring that at
least 40% of the employees of contractors and subcontractors working on city construction
projects be Camden residents). See also Appellate Body Reports, Canada—Certain Measures
Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Section, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in
Tariff Program, ¶ 5.85, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May
24, 2013) (finding that requirements to use locally manufactured components to qualify for
support under Canada’s feed-in tariff violate violate Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
standards).
26. See generally Timothy Meyer, How Local Discrimination Can Promote Global Public Goods, 95
B.U. L. REV. 1939 (2015) (arguing that discriminatory renewable energy programs can in-
crease global welfare in the aggregate).
27. See infra Part II.
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State feed-in tariffs, on the other hand, are more vulnerable to Supremacy
Clause challenges28 because they require state regulators to set rates for power
sales from renewable generators to electric utilities. The Federal Power Act
(“FPA”) generally reserves ratemaking authority in these types of wholesale
transactions for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). What
little ratemaking authority states have over wholesale transactions under the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”) is subject to strict price caps
based on the avoided-cost doctrine.29 Under this doctrine, states may use their
PURPA authority only to set rates up to the cost that the utility avoids by not
generating the electricity itself or purchasing it from another source.30 Tradi-
tionally, this avoided-cost cap has been determined based on the lowest-cost
alternative power source—usually coal-fired or, more recently, natural gas-fired
electricity—and, hence, would be too low to cover the higher generation costs
of emerging renewable energy technologies. In light of these statutory limita-
tions on state ratemaking authority, many scholars consider it impossible for
states to adopt feed-in tariffs with rates high enough to effectively promote
renewable energy without preemption under the Supremacy Clause.31 In a re-
cent article, feed-in tariff expert Lincoln Davies succinctly sums up the prevail-
ing scholary skepticism: “Because the Constitution declares federal law
supreme, both PURPA and the FPA effectively prevent states from adopting
feed-in tariffs.”32
The vulnerability of state renewable portfolio standards to dormant Com-
merce Clause challenges has prompted a growing number of scholars to argue
28. See infra Part III.
29. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2012). See also Steven R. Miles, Full-Avoided Cost Pricing Under
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act: “Just and Reasonable” to Electric Consumers?, 69 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1267, 1269 (1984).
30. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b).
31. See, e.g., David Bloom et al., State Feed-in-Tariffs: Recent FERC Guidance for How to Make
Them FiT under Federal Law, 24 THE ELEC. J. 26, 27 (2011); Lincoln L. Davies, U.S.
Renewable Energy Policy in Context, 15 ENVTL. L & POL’Y 33, 57 (2015); Michael Dorsi,
Clean Energy Pricing and Federalism: Legal Obstacles and Options for Feed-in Tariffs, 35 ENVI-
RONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 173, 185 (2012); Steven Ferrey, Follow the Money! Article I and
Article VI Constitutional Barriers to Renewable Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 VA. J. L. &
TECH. 89, 107, 115, 117 (2012); Katherine D. Kelly, Don’t Hide Behind Statutory Road-
blocks: How the United States Can Resolve Conflicts to Implementing the German Feed-In Tariff
Model and Contribute to International Efforts to Control Climate Change, 50 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 726, 763 (2012); Jim Rossi, Clean Energy and the Price Preemption Ceiling, 3
SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 243, 255 (2012); Steven Weissman, Effective Re-
newable Energy Policy: Leave It to the States?, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 345,
360–61 (2012). For a more detailed discussion of the federal preemption chorus, see infra
Part III.B.2.
32. Davies, supra note 31, at 57. R
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for judicial reform of today’s Commerce Clause doctrine.33 Others call on Con-
gress to adopt legislation that expressly authorizes states to adopt discrimina-
tory renewable portfolio standards.34 In light of the looming threat of federal
preemption, proponents of state feed-in tariffs, too, call for their explicit en-
dorsement through Congressional action.35 This Article argues that no such
sweeping—and politically improbable—reform is necessary.
Contrary to sustained, strong scholarly skepticism, recent FERC prece-
dent has created an opening for state policymakers to craft renewable energy
policies that capture most of the associated economic benefits in-state while
minimizing constitutional concerns. Remarkably, and somewhat counterintui-
tively, the way forward is for states to simultaneously implement both renewa-
ble portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs.
Common intuition suggests that combining both policies would also ag-
gregate their respective constitutional risks and thereby increase the adopting
state’s overall vulnerability to constitutional challenges of its renewable energy
policy program. Refuting common intuition as well as widespread scholarly
skepticism, this Article makes the case that joint implementation of state-level
renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs allows policymakers to capture
significant economic benefits in-state while reducing, rather than exacerbating,
the state’s overall risk of constitutional attacks on its climate and clean energy
policies.
In its recent California Public Utilities Commission36 decision, FERC en-
dorses state feed-in tariff programs under PURPA that require utilities to pay
higher rates for electricity from renewables so long as (i) there is a state man-
date, such as a renewable portfolio standard, that requires utilities to procure a
certain percentage of electricity from renewable sources, and (ii) the established
33. See Michael Barsa & David A. Dana, A Climate Change Lens on the Dormant Commerce
Clause, Lifecycle GHG Taxes, and In-State RPSS Requirements, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 69, 71–72 (2014); Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to
Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 243, 324 (1999); Danny Englese, Tilting at Windmills: Finding an Alternative Dormant
Commerce Clause Framework to Preserve Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Location Re-
quirements, 47 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 983, 1002 (2015); Sam Kalen, Dormancy Versus Innovation, 65
OKLA L. REV. 381, 424–25 (2013); Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfo-
lio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 355–60 (2013). But see William Griffin, Renewable
Portfolio Standards and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Case for In-Region Location Re-
quirements, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 133, 161 (2014) (arguing that in-region require-
ments in Massachusetts’s state RPS could be deemed constitutional under existing dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine).
34. See Nathan Endrud, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and Rele-
vance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal
Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 270, 280 (2008).
35. See Kelly, supra note 31, at 773; Weissman, supra note 31, at 360. R
36. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n., 133 FERC ¶ 61,059 (Oct. 20, 2010).
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rate does not exceed the avoided cost for these renewables.37 Through these
requirements, FERC not only pays homage to states’ historic sovereignty over
fuel choice38 but also acts the part of matchmaker for state-level feed-in tariffs
and renewable portfolio standards, requiring state policymakers to adopt a port-
folio standard in order to use their PURPA authority to set effective, yet pre-
emption-proof feed-in tariff rates.39
In exchange for this renewable portfolio standard-induced shield against
preemption, feed-in tariffs allow states to capture the economic benefits of re-
newable energy in-state to a degree that a state renewable portfolio standard
could not without raising concerns under the dormant Commerce Clause. That
is because PURPA’s geographically limited jurisdictional grant creates an im-
plicit location requirement for renewable power generators to operate in close
proximity to local in-state networks. After all, a PURPA-based, state-level
feed-in tariff can require only local, in-state utilities to grant renewable genera-
tors interconnection with local networks and to purchase their output at above-
market rates. In a renewable portfolio standard, an express location requirement
of this sort would most certainly be held to violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. When it derives naturally from a PURPA-based feed-in tariff’s geo-
graphically limited scope of application, however, such an implicit location re-
quirement offers state policymakers a constitutionally sound strategy for
ensuring that state policy-induced renewable energy deployment, along with
the associated job creation and other economic benefits, occurs within the
state.40
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part One offers a short primer on re-
newable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs. Part Two surveys recent Com-
merce Clause litigation over the constitutionality of state-level renewable
portfolio standards and assesses their vulnerability to constitutional challenges.
Part Three surveys recent Supremacy Clause challenges to state-level feed-in
tariffs and develops their constitutional risk profile. Part Four pushes back
against the literature’s longstanding view that renewable portfolio standards and
feed-in tariffs represent mutually exclusive policy alternatives and draws on re-
cent FERC precedent to argue that both policies should, in fact, be jointly
implemented to more effectively advance global and local environmental and
economic interests alike—at an overall lower risk of constitutional challenges
than either policy alone. Part Five explores normative implications of the pro-
posed solution for state leadership in climate and clean energy policy.
37. See id. at 61,267.
38. See Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got It Right: There’s No Need to Mandate Renewable Portfolio
Standards, 27 ENERGY L. J. 451, 454 (2008); Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable
Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1448 (2010). See also infra Part II.B.1
39. See infra Part III.B.3.
40. See infra Part IV.
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I. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AND FEED-IN TARIFFS:
A PRIMER
Renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs both aim to promote the
deployment of low-carbon, renewable energy generation infrastructure but each
policy employs different means to achieve their common objective. Where port-
folio standards rely on the market’s invisible hand to determine the value of
renewable electricity, feed-in tariffs require regulators to set the appropriate
rates for renewable power.41 These and other design characteristics and differ-
ences not only shape each policy’s political appeal but also affect its constitu-
tional risk profile. To better appreciate this dynamic relationship, this section
seeks to provide a working knowledge of each policy’s principal features.
A renewable portfolio standard, also known as a renewable target or quota
obligation, requires electric utility companies to source a certain share of the
electricity they sell to end-users from renewable sources of energy.42 Utilities
prove their compliance with these requirements through “renewable energy
credits” (“RECs”).43 Power plant operators normally receive one such credit for
every megawatt hour (“MWh”) of electricity generated from renewable re-
sources.44 Non-utility power generators, also known as independent power pro-
ducers, can sell their RECs to utilities in order to receive a premium on top of
their income from power sales in the wholesale electricity market. Utilities sub-
ject to a renewable portfolio standard’s sourcing requirements can also invest in
their own renewable power generation facilities to earn RECs for the electricity
they produce. Whether utilities choose to earn their own credits or purchase
them from others, they eventually pass the associated costs on to their ratepay-
ers.45 Many portfolio standards are technology-neutral and award the same
amount of credits for all eligible renewable energy technologies. More and more
jurisdictions, however, implement technology-specific renewable portfolio stan-
dards, that offer carve-outs or credit multipliers for select renewable energy
technologies46 and project size and location.47 In 1983, Iowa became the first
41. See Felix Mormann, Re-Allocating Risk: The Case for Closer Integration of Price- and Quan-
tity-Based Support Policies for Clean Energy, 27 THE ELEC. J. 9, 13 (2014).
42. See Reinhard Haas et al., A Historical Review of Promotion Strategies for Electricity from Re-
newable Energy Sources in EU Countries, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY RE-
VIEWS 1003, 1011–12 (2011); MIGUEL MENDONC¸A ET AL., POWERING THE GREEN
ECONOMY–THE FEED-IN TARIFF HANDBOOK 161 (2009).
43. Haas et al., supra note 42, at 1014; MENDONC¸A ET AL., supra note 42, at 161. Internation- R
ally, renewable energy credits are also referred to as Tradable Green Certificates or Renewa-
ble Energy Guarantees of Origin.
44. See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1340, 1359, 1378 (2010) (reporting that some states award RECs for every kWh of renewa-
ble electricity generation).
45. See id. at 1410.
46. See, e.g., infra note 169 and accompanying text. R
47. See, e.g., infra note 170 and accompanying text. R
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state in the union to adopt a renewable portfolio standard.48 Today, twenty-
nine states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S. territories have adopted
portfolio standards to promote the deployment of renewable energy technolo-
gies.49 International adopters of renewable portfolio standards include Australia,
Belgium, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.50
Feed-in tariffs are two-pronged policy instruments for the promotion of
renewables deployment.51 The “feed-in” prong guarantees renewable power
generators access to their local power grid in order to ensure viable sales and
distribution channels for their electricity. The “tariff” prong requires local elec-
tric utilities to purchase the power output of these generators at above-market
rates that are designed to cover the generator’s cost and offer a reasonable re-
turn on investment.52 These rates can be set as a fixed total price for electricity
from renewables, a premium to be paid in addition to the market price, or a
percentage of retail rates.53 While renewable portfolio standards let the market
determine trading prices for RECs and, hence, the overall value of renewable
electricity, feed-in tariffs require regulators to set tariff rates at a level that is
high enough to effectively incentivize investment in renewable power genera-
tion without offering windfall profits.54 Like portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs
pass the costs of premium payments for renewable energy onto ratepayers.55
48. See Davies, supra note 44, at 1357.
49. See N.C. Clean Energy Tech. Ctr., Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies (2016), https://
perma.cc/2JVN-WKT8. Eight more states and one U.S. territory have adopted non-binding
goals for the deployment of renewables. See id. For a discussion of the history and political
background of state renewable portfolio standards, see Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The
Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y 10, 10 (2007).
50. See MENDONC¸A ET AL., supra note 42, at 150; INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING R
RENEWABLES—PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE POLICIES 94 (2008).
51. Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs to Meet U.S. Renewable
Electricity Targets, 20 THE ELEC. J. 73, 73 (2007). For a detailed description of the various
feed-in tariff design elements, see MENDONC¸A ET AL., supra note 42, at 15. R
52. The first-ever feed-in tariff in the United States, implemented with great success by the
municipality of Gainesville, Florida, was designed to offer a return on investment of 5–6%.
See KARLYNN CORY ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY:
DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS (2009), https://perma.cc/
XSE7-EX5Z. The duration of the utility’s purchase obligation under a feed-in tariff ranges
from eight years in Spain to fifteen years in France to twenty years in Germany, see Domi-
nique Finon, Pros and Cons of Alternative Policies Aimed at Promoting Renewables, 12 EIB
PAPERS 110, 115 (2007).
53. The second option is sometimes referred to as a “feed-in premium” or “premium feed-in
tariff,” see MENDONC¸A ET AL., supra note 42, at 40. For an example of the retail rate per- R
centage option, see, e.g., Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff, Comparison of Feed-in Tariff,
Quota and Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development, 33 RENEWABLE EN-
ERGY 1854, 1855 (2008). Unless expressly stated otherwise, this Article refers to all of these
options uniformly as feed-in tariffs.
54. MENDONC¸A ET AL., supra note 42, at 19. R
55. Id. at 29.
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Feed-in tariffs are usually technology-specific offering different tariff rates for
different strands of renewable energy technologies based on their respective
technological maturity and generation costs.56 In addition, feed-in tariff design
can be size-sensitive so as to account for the different cost structures of utility-
scale and distributed generation.57 Historically, feed-in tariffs have been partic-
ularly popular in European countries such as Denmark, Germany, Portugal,
and Spain.58 Recent U.S. adopters of feed-in tariff programs to promote renew-
ables include California,59 Hawaii,60 Maine,61 Oregon,62 Rhode Island,63 Ver-
mont,64 and Washington.65
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS
A number of state renewable portfolio standards have recently come under
attack for alleged violations of the Constitution. Recent litigation reveals the
Commerce Clause as the most common grounds for constitutional challenges
(infra Section A.) and provides the canvas on which to sketch a constitutional
risk profile for state-level portfolio standard policies (infra Section B.). Unlike
state feed-in tariffs,66 the current generation of state renewable portfolio stan-
dards does not raise preemption issues under the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause.67
56. Id. at 26. For an example of cost reductions through technology learning in solar photovolta-
ics and onshore wind energy, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
SPECIAL REPORT RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES—SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 12
(2011).
57. MENDONC¸A ET AL., supra note 42, at 27. R
58. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 50, at 94. For further background, see generally R
David Grinlinton & LeRoy Paddock, The Role of Feed-in Tariffs in Supporting the Expansion
of Solar Energy Production, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 943 (2010). More recently, many jurisdic-
tions outside of Europe have adopted FITs to promote renewable energy, including the
Canadian province of Ontario, South Africa, Kenya, the Indian states West Bengal, Rajas-
than, Gujarat, and Punjab, as well as Australia’s Capital Territory, New South Wales, and
South Australia. See MENDONC¸A ET AL., supra note 42, at 77. R
59. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.20 (West 2017).
60. See Decisions and Orders, Docket 2008-0273, Haw. Pub. Util. Comm’n (2008), https://
perma.cc/E835-EVXC.
61. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3603 (West 2016).
62. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 757.365 (West 2016) and implementing Orders 10-198, 10-
200, 11-339 by the Oregon Public Utilities Commission.
63. See 39 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 39-26.1, 39-26.2 (West 2016).
64. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 8005a (West 2016).
65. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.16.110 (West 2016), WASH. ADMIN. CODE 458-20-273
(West 2016).
66. See infra Part III.
67. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Solving the Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle Surrounding
State “Sustainable” Energy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 182 (2014) (“Renewable
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The Constitution’s Commerce Clause has long played a pivotal part in
determining the proper allocation and exercise of state and federal authority
related to environmental68 and energy69 policy and regulation. The ability of
states to serve as laboratories of democracy70 and sustainability through climate
and clean energy policy innovation is constrained by the Constitution’s Com-
merce Clause. In pertinent part, the Commerce Clause states that “Congress
shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”71
While this affirmative grant of authority to Congress72 imposes no express limi-
portfolio standards at the state level do not raise constitutional Supremacy Clause issues but
in the design of some state programs raise dormant commerce clause issues.”); Harvey Rei-
ter, Removing Unconstitutional Barriers to Out-of-State and Foreign Competition from State
Renewable Portfolio Standards: Why the Dormant Commerce Clause Provides Important Protec-
tion for Consumers and Environmentalists, 36 ENERGY L.J. 45, 66 (2015) (“Neither the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) . . . nor the Federal Power Act (FPA) . . .
preempts states from favoring renewable resources over conventional fossil fuel generation.”).
68. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 108 (1994) (invalidat-
ing Oregon statute imposing extra fee on import of out-of-state waste for disposal); C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 385–86 (1994) (invalidating municipal
flow control ordinance mandating solid waste to be processed at designated transfer station
before leaving municipality); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 346–348
(1992) (invalidating Alabama statute imposing extra fee on import of out-of-state hazardous
waste for disposal); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504
U.S. 353, 367–68 (1992) (invalidating Michigan statute prohibiting landfill operators from
accepting waste from other counties); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (upholding
Maine statute banning import of live baitfish from out-of-state); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458
U.S. 941, 960 (1982) (invalidating Nebraska statute’s reciprocity requirement for out-of-
state use of Nebraska groundwater); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1979) (invali-
dating Oklahoma statute prohibiting out-of-state export of minnows taken from in-state
waters); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (invalidating New
Jersey statute banning the import of solid waste). See also Christine A. Klein, The Environ-
mental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 44 (2003).
69. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 280 (1998) (invalidating
Ohio statute reserving state-issued tax credits for ethanol to ethanol produced in-state or in
states offering tax credits for Ohio-produced tax credits); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S.
437, 458 (1992) (invalidating Oklahoma statute requiring in-state utilities to burn a mini-
mum share of local coal); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 344
(1982) (invalidating New Hampshire statute restricting out-of-state exports of hydropower);
All. for Clean Coal v. Miller, 50 F.3d 591, 596–97 (7th Cir. 1995) (invalidating Illinois
statute requiring in-state utilities to consider local coal industry in developing Clean Air Act
compliance plans while granting full rate recovery for scrubbers in plants burning Illinois
coal); All. for Clean Coal v. Bayh, 72 F.3d 556, 560–61 (7th Cir. 1995) (invalidating Indi-
ana statute on commerce clause grounds).
70. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
72. Over the years, different courts have interpreted the scope of the Commerce Clause’s affirm-
ative grant of authority differently. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (recognizing Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause to
enact the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibit
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\41-1\HLE106.txt unknown Seq: 14  5-MAY-17 11:45
202 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 41
tation on state authority, the Commerce Clause “has long been understood to
have a ‘negative’ aspect that denies the States the power unjustifiably to dis-
criminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”73 This
“negative” or “dormant” corollary dominated the first century of Commerce
Clause cases before the Supreme Court.74 The Court continues to interpret the
dormant Commerce Clause to prohibit “economic protectionism” in the form
of “regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by bur-
dening out-of-state competitors.”75
Just as “the Framers’ distrust of economic Balkanization was limited by
their federalism favoring a degree of local autonomy,”76 so, too, is the dormant
Commerce Clause’s denial of state authority limited. Where state regulation
discriminates against interstate commerce on its face, in its purpose, or in its
practical effect, it is subject to strict scrutiny and will be held virtually per se
unconstitutional unless the state can demonstrate that its regulation serves a
legitimate local purpose and this purpose can not be served as well by available
nondiscriminatory means.77
One important exception to the dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence’s general ban on inter-state discrimination is the market participant doc-
trine. Under this doctrine, where a state or local government enters and
participates in the relevant market, say by owning or funding the enterprise
racial discrimination by motels serving interstate travelers); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 128–29 (1942) (acknowledging Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to regulate,
through the Agricultural Act of 1938, wheat grown and consumed on the same farm based
on the substantial effect of such home-growing activities in defeating and obstructing the
Act’s purpose to stimulate inter-state trade in wheat). For examples of more restrictive inter-
pretation, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (holding that Con-
gress did not have Commerce Clause authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act
because gender-motivated crimes of violence do not constitute economic activity); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560–61 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because possession of a gun in a local
school zone does not constitute economic activity stubstantially affecting interstate
commerce).
73. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (citing Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876)).
74. See, e.g., Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829) (holding that a
Delaware act authorizing construction of a dam on the Delaware River was not “repugnant
to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state”). See also Kalen, supra note 33, at R
387; Klein, supra note 68, at 23, 44.
75. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192–93 (1994) (citing New Energy Co. of
Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988)).
76. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS.
7, 11 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 42, 51 (James Madison); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
77. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979)).
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receiving preferential treatment through state regulation, such regulation does
not run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause.78
If a state regulates even-handedly in pursuit of a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, the pertinent
regulation will be upheld unless courts find the burden imposed on such com-
merce to be clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.79 A state
law that does not discriminate against out-of-state entitites may nevertheless be
found to violate the dormant Commerce Clause if it effectively controls con-
duct beyond that state’s boundaries.80 Under the Commerce Clause’s extraterri-
toriality doctrine, courts generally apply strict scrutiny and strike down state
laws that have the practical effect of regulating commerce occurring wholly
outside the regulating state’s borders.81
A. Recent Litigation over State Renewable Portfolio Standards
State-level renewable portfolio standards are under sustained and system-
atic attack for violations of the dormant Commerce Clause from a remarkably
diverse potpourri of plaintiffs. Not surprisingly, mining interests worried about
sinking demand for coal and other fossil fuels in an increasingly renewables-
fueled energy economy lead the charge in several states.82 Elsewhere, large in-
state electricity customers attack local state portfolio standards driven by fear of
rising power prices as the result of the state’s commitment to renewable en-
ergy.83 Electric utilities, too, challenge local renewable portfolio standards in an
78. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky., 553 U.S. 328, 339 (2008); United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 362 (2007); White v. Mass.
Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 207 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429, 436 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807–08 (1976).
79. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). For an instructive sample application of
the Pike balancing test, see Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662,
678–79 (1981) (invalidating Iowa law banning the use of sixty-five-foot double-trailer trucks
within the state due to safety benefits found insufficient to overcome the imposed burden on
interstate commerce).
80. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (citing Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (“The critical inquiry is
whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of
the State.”)).
81. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 337. See also Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy,
Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY
L. 127, 142–48 (2014) (distinguishing between the Supreme Court’s line of price-affirma-
tion and business cases and its line of transportation cases related to the extraterritoriality
doctrine).
82. See challenges to the renewable portfolio standards of Colorado (infra notes 94–103 and R
accompanying text) and Minnesota (infra notes 109–116 and accompanying text). R
83. For example, Missouri’s renewable portfolio standard has faced several challenges. See infra
notes 104–108 and accompanying text. R
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apparent attempt to protect their own generation assets against competition
from incoming renewable power generators.84 Notwithstanding their differing
motives, all of these plaintiffs seek to use the dormant Commerce Clause to
shut down, rather than expand, emerging state markets for renewable energy.
Truer to the Clause’s anti-protectionist and pro-competitive thrust, some elec-
tric utilities85 as well as generators86 and manufacturers87 within the renewables
industry challenge the constitutionality of state portfolio standards in order to
open up the respective state’s renewable energy market to out-of-state firms.
In spring of 2010, TransCanada Power Marketing, seeking to sell hydro-
power into Massachussetts, challenged the Commonwealth’s renewable portfo-
lio standard alleging that its solar carve-out for in-state distributed generation
and its in-state eligibility requirements for long-term utility purchase agree-
ments over renewable electricity violated the Constitution’s dormant Com-
merce Clause.88 TransCanada and the state of Massachusetts eventually settled
the case, granting the plaintiff its desired access to the Commonwealth’s power
market while avoiding a judgment on the constitutionality of the state’s renew-
able portfolio standard.89 Prompted by the lawsuit, Massachusetts amended the
underlying statute to suspend90 and, eventually, repeal91 the portfolio standard’s
in-state eligibility requirements for long-term utility purchase agreements over
renewable electricity. The solar carve-out for in-state distributed generation,
however, remains in place.92
In 2011, American Tradition Institute (“ATI”)93 filed suit in federal court
alleging that Colorado’s renewable portfolio standard violated the dormant
84. See id.
85. See challenges to the RPSs of California (infra notes 117–127 and accompanying text) and R
Missouri (infra notes 104–108 and accompanying text). R
86. See challenges to the Massachusetts RPS (infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text). R
87. See challenges to the Delaware RPS (infra notes 128–132 and accompanying text). R
88. See Complaint at 3–17, TransCanada Power Marketing LTD v. Bowles, CA (2010) (No.
4:10cv-40070-FDS).
89. See Transcanada Renewable Lawsuit Scores a Win in MA, CLIMATE LAWYERS BLOG (June
11, 2010), http://perma.cc/F2LV-EJ7Q.
90. Order Adopting Emergency Regulations, Decision No. 10-58 (Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Utils.
June 9, 2010), https://perma.cc/U3T8-NLE2 (striking the words “within the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, its waters and adjacent federal waters” from its regulations at 220
MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01(1) (2009) and “in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts” from
220 MASS. CODE REGS.17.05(1)(c)(4) (2009)).
91. Order Adopting Final Regulations, Decision No. 10-58-A (Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Utils. Aug.
20, 2010), https://perma.cc/HJ5V-95NW.
92. See 225 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.05(4)(a) (2016) (“The Solar Carve-out Renewable Genera-
tion Unit must use solar photovoltaic technology, be used on-site, located in the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, and be interconnected with the electric grid.”).
93. Originally launched in Colorado in early 2009 as the Western Tradition Institute, the ATI
describes itself as a public policy research and educational foundation. Tax filings suggest
financial support by oil, gas, and coal interests. See AM. TRADITION INST., DESMOG:
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\41-1\HLE106.txt unknown Seq: 17  5-MAY-17 11:45
2017] Regulatory Opportunities for State Climate Policy 205
Commerce Clause for a number of reasons.94 ATI’s most fundamental attack
claimed that Colorado’s mandate that 30% of the state’s retail electricity sales
must come from renewable sources by 202095 violated the dormant Commerce
Clause by limiting the sales of electricity generated from sources that participate
in the interstate retail electricity market and by discriminating in favor of Colo-
rado.96 ATI’s more targeted attacks aimed at Colorado’s Tradable Renewable
Energy Credits Limitation Program, Standard Rebate Offer Program, Recov-
ery of Cost Incentives Program, and Retail Rate Impact Rule.97 In its earlier
complaints, ATI also attacked several provisions within the Colorado portfolio
standard that offered credit multipliers to certain classes of generators if they
were located within the state.98 Before a decision on the merits, the Colorado
legislature responded to ATI’s lawsuit by amending the underlying statute to
eliminate all in-state location preferences.99
On summary judgment, the District Court ruled against ATI, now calling
itself Energy and Environment Legal Institute (“EELI”), holding that Colo-
rado’s renewable portfolio standard did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.100 The court held that the mandate—in its revised post-2013 form—
does not impermissibly control wholly out-of-state commerce because it does
not affect commerce unless and until an out-of-state electricity generator freely
chooses to do business with a Colorado utility.101 The court went on to hold
that the shift from fossil fuel-fired electricity generation to low-carbon renewa-
ble generation effectuated by the Colorado renewable portfolio standard does
not constitute an excessive burden on interstate commerce.102 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision.103
Also in 2011, a group of large electricity customers and electric utility
companies filed suit in Missouri state court alleging a dormant Commerce
Clause violation through regulations that accepted only bundled RECs, i.e.,
credits traded together with the electricity for which they were issued, as proof
CLEARING THE PR POLLUTION THAT CLOUDS CLIMATE SCIENCE (2016), http://perma
.cc/NG22-N5X9.
94. See Am. Tradition Inst. v. Colorado, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1227–28 (D. Colo. 2012).
95. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(I)(E) (2010).
96. See Am. Tradition Inst., 876 F. Supp. 2d at 1227–28.
97. See id. at 1228.
98. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief, at ¶¶ 70, 72, 74, Am. Tradition Inst. v.
Colorado, No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-KLM (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2011).
99. See 2013 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 414 (S.B. 13-252) (2013).
100. See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (D. Colo. 2014).
101. See id. at 1179.
102. See id. at 1183 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978)).
103. See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 595 (2015).
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of compliance with the state’s renewable portfolio standard.104 The court
avoided the Commerce Clause challenge by striking the regulation for lack of
the public service commission’s authority to include a bundling requirement in
its regulations that was not considered in the enabling legislation for Missouri’s
renewable portfolio standard.105 One year later, plaintiffs reiterated their argu-
ments regarding the regulations’ alleged violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause on appeal.106 Plaintiffs also voiced concerns over the portfolio standard’s
impact on electricity rates.107 But the appellate court considered the challenge
moot given that the public service commission had, in the meantime, with-
drawn the controversial provisions before its regulation entered into force.108
In late 2011, the state of North Dakota and several coal companies filed
suit in federal court alleging, among other things, that Minnesota’s Next Gen-
eration Energy Act (“NGEA”) violates the dormant Commerce Clause.109
Breaking with previously observed litigation patterns, North Dakota’s challenge
does not target the NGEA’s provisions related to the Minnesota renewable
portfolio standard’s positive sourcing mandate that 25% of the state’s energy
consumption come from renewables by 2025.110 Instead, North Dakota and its
co-plaintiffs attack the NGEA’s “negative” sourcing mandate that “no person
shall . . . import or commit to import from outside the state power from a new
large energy facility that would contribute to statewide power sector carbon
dioxide emissions; or . . . enter into a new long-term power purchase agreement
that would increase statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions.”111 The
NGEA defines “statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions” to include
“all emissions of carbon dioxide from the generation of electricity imported
from outside the state and consumed in Minnesota.”112
The District Court found that the pertinent provisions of the NGEA vio-
late the dormant Commerce Clause because they constitute impermissible ex-
traterritorial regulation.113 As electricity entering the near boundary-less grid
104. State, ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Nos. 10AC-CC00511, 10AC-
CC00512, 10AC-CC00513, 10AC-CC00528, 10AC-CC536, Doc. No.
SL01DOCS\3510904.2 (Mo. Ct. App. June 29, 2011).
105. See id. at 12 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 393.1030.1 (2012)) (allowing utilities to comply with
the state renewable portfolio standard in whole or in part by purchasing renewable energy
credits.).
106. State, ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 386 S.W.3d 165, 175 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2012).
107. See id. at 170.
108. See id. at 176 (citing 4 CSR 240–20.100 (2)(A) and (2)(B)(2)).
109. North Dakota v. Swanson, CIV. 11-3232 SRN/SER, 2012 WL 4479246 (D. Minn. 2012).
110. MINN. STAT. § 216C.05, subdiv. 2(2) (2010).
111. MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subdiv. 3(2), (3) (2010).
112. MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subdiv. 2 (2010).
113. See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 916, 919 (D. Minn. 2014). See also
David M. Driesen, Must the States Discriminate Against Their Own Producers Under the Dor-
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becomes indistinguishable from the rest of the electricity in the grid, the court
found, the NGEA effectively requires out-of-state parties to conduct their out-
of-state business according to Minnesota law.114 In addition, the NGEA was
found to improperly require non-Minnesota merchants to seek regulatory ap-
proval before undertaking transactions with other non-Minnesota entities.115
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision.116
In early 2012, Public Utility District No. 1 of Washington’s Cowlitz
County (“Cowlitz”) filed an application for rehearing before the California
Public Utilities Commission, alleging that the three-tiered structure of Califor-
nia’s renewable portfolio standard and the Commission’s implementing regula-
tions violate the dormant Commerce Clause.117 One year earlier, SB 2 (1X)118
had restructured California’s renewable energy sourcing requirements into three
separate tiers.119 Category One encompasses energy and RECs delivered to a
California balancing authority without substituting electricity from another
source. Category Two includes energy and credits that cannot be delivered to a
California balancing authority without substituting electricity from another
source. Category Three applies to unbundled remewable energy credits and
credits that do not meet the conditions for the previous two categories.120 Cali-
fornia’s revised renewable portfolio standard requires that its sourcing require-
ments be met primarily with transactions that fall into Category One.121
Cowlitz alleged that the revised three-tiered structure makes it more diffi-
cult for utilities to use renewable energy imported from out-of-state generators
to comply with California’s portfolio standard. As an out-of-state developer of
wind projects and exporter of wind-generated electricity to California, Cowlitz
argued that California’s three-tiered sourcing structure caused it to lose a con-
mant Commerce Clause?, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2016) (using the District Court’s Heydinger
decision as the basis for developing novel rationales for extraterritorial regulation that should
not run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause).
114. See id. at 918.
115. See id. at 918–19 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989)).
116. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 923 (8th Cir. 2016). Interestingly, only one of
the three appellate judges found the NGEA to violate the dormant Commerce Clause, with
the remaining two affirming the district court’s decision based on a finding that the NGEA’s
negative sourcing mandate was subject to preemption by the FPA. One of the latter two
further found the NGEA’s negative sourcing mandate to be preempted by the Clean Air
Act.
117. Application of Public Utility District No. 1 of Cowlitz County for Rehearing of Decision
11-12-052 (Jan. 20, 2012), https://perma.cc/3G7V-VGVC.
118. 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1st Ex. Sess. Ch. 1 (S.B. 2) (West), https://perma.cc/S5A3-9E6C.
119. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.16(b) (2011).
120. See id. § 399.16(b)(1).
121. California’s RPS mandates that the share of Category One transactions to meet the required
share of renewable electricity rise from at least 50% in 2011 to a minimum of 75% starting in
2017. See id. § 399.16(c)(1).
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tract to supply wind energy to California’s Pacific Gas & Eletric.122 Cowlitz
claimed that the three-tiered renewable portfolio standard violates the dormant
Commerce Clause because its practical effect is to discriminate against out-of-
state generators.123 Category One’s requirement to deliver eligible energy to the
California balancing authority was alleged to grant preferential treatment to in-
state generators at the expense of out-of-state generators who are less likely to
comply with the delivery requirement.124 Similarly, Cowlitz alleged that the
bundling requirement for RECs and other requirements for Category Two dis-
criminate against out-of-state generators and violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.125
The California Public Utilities Commission denied Cowlitz’ application
for rehearing citing the county’s failure to demonstrate that California’s three-
tiered renewable portfolio standard facially or practically discriminates against
out-of-state generators of renewable electricity because it regulates evenhand-
edly and does not draw a distinction or apply different rules merely because a
generator is located out-of-state as opposed to in-state.126 As an aside, the
Commission noted that the three-tiered structure of the state’s renewable port-
folio standard would also pass constitutional muster under the Pike balancing
test.127
In summer of 2012, FuelCell Energy, a Connecticut-based manufacturer
of fuel cells, filed suit in federal court alleging that the 2011 Amendments to
the statute implementing Delaware’s renewable portfolio standard128 violated
the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause.129
The Amendments had added energy from fuel cells to the types of power gen-
eration eligible for credit-earning compliance with the state’s sourcing mandate
provided that the fuel cell-powered generation facility is “located in Dela-
ware.”130 In addition, the underlying statute, as amended, requires that such a
facility be owned and/or operated by an entity that “manufactures fuel cells in
Delaware” and that state authorities designate as an “economic development
122. See Application of Public Utility District No. 1, supra note 117, at 5. R
123. See id. at 11.
124. See id. at 10.
125. See id. at 17.
126. See Order Denying Applications for Rehearing of Decision 11-12-052, Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n (Nov. 1, 2013), https://perma.cc/J928-BC5T.
127. Id. at 16 n.12.
128. See 26 DEL. CODE §§ 351–64 (2016).
129. See Nichols v. Markell, No. CV 12-777-CJB, 2014 WL 1509780, at *22–25 (D. Del. 2014).
The suit of the named plaintiff Nichols, a Delaware ratepayer, was dismissed for lack of
standing. Id. at *25.
130. 26 DEL. CODE § 352(17) (2016).
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opportunity.”131 The case settled in late 2015 with a consent order requiring
defendants to ignore the latter two—but not the first—requirements.132
B. Sketching a Constitutional Risk Profile for State
Renewable Portfolio Standards
Recent litigation133 along with a growing body of pertinent literature134
suggests that the greatest threat to state renewable portfolio standards, in terms
of constitutional attacks, lies in dormant Commerce Clause challenges. The
frequency and efficacy of these challenges depend in large part on the degree
and modalities by which state portfolio standards seek to internalize the eco-
nomic benefits derived from thus induced renewable energy deployment.
For the purposes of global climate change mitigation through greenhouse
gas emission reductions, it matters little whether the solar and wind energy that
displaces carbon-intensive fossil-fueled energy is generated in-state, out-of-
state or even in another country.135 Climate science indicates that the heat-
trapping effect of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere manifests itself across the
globe regardless of whether these gases are emitted in New York or New
Delhi.136 Location matters greatly, however, for the job creation, tax revenue,
and other economic benefits associated with renewable energy deployment.137
State policymakers and their constituents may be willing to give their neighbors
and, ultimately, the rest of the world a free ride regarding the climate benefits
131. Id. § 352(16).
132. See Nichols v. Markell, No. CV 12-777-CJB, at *2–3 (D. Del. Oct. 20, 2015). Defendants
also agreed to pay for FuelCell’s attorneys’ fees. Id. at *4.
133. See supra Part II.A.
134. See, e.g., CAROLYN ELEFANT & EDWARD A. HOLT, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE,
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARD PROGRAMS (2011); Endrud, supra note 34; Stephen Ferrey, Threading the Con- R
stitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewa-
ble Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 59 (2012); Kalen, supra note 33; Alexandra B. R
Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 180 (2013); Lee & Duane, supra note 33; Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable R
Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 34 (2009).
For an earlier, slightly broader analysis, see Engel, supra note 33. R
135. Other environmental benefits associated with substituting renewable energy generation for
fossil-fueled power generation, such as air quality improvements and water conservation,
accrue at a more local scale. See Mormann, supra note 1, at 1638 (describing the local envi- R
ronmental benefits associated with renewable energy).
136. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523–24 (2007) (acknowledging that the warming
effect of greenhouse gas emissions manifests itself globally regardless of their point of origin
but rejecting EPA’s argument that, therefore, regulation of domestic greenhouse gas emis-
sions would be ineffective due to projected increases in greenhouse gas emissions from
China, India, and other developing nations).
137. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 33, at 268, 274 (mourning the “hemorrhage” of economic benefits R
as a downside of state RPS programs).
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created through their state’s commitment to low-carbon renewables. But they
tend to feel less generous about related opportunities for economic
development.
The 2011 amendments to Delaware’s renewable portfolio standard offer
an illustrative example of how state policymakers use clean energy deployment
as a vehicle for promoting in-state economic interests.138 The record reveals
that, prior to the amendments, Delaware officials had negotiated with a manu-
facturer of fuel cells to open up a factory in Delaware.139 The amendments
eventually added fuel cells to the suite of technologies eligible for compliance
with the sourcing mandate, along with in-state manufacture and location re-
quirements—all in consideration of the “associated employment and other eco-
nomic benefits” expected to accrue to the state and its residents.140 Such joint
pursuit of global environmental interests and in-state economic interests is by
no means unique to Delaware and will likely endear policymakers to their local
constituents. Keeping the economic benefits of renewable energy deployment
within the state’s geographic boundaries, however, may require design elements
that increase a state-level portfolio standard’s vulnerability to dormant Com-
merce Clause challenges. To be sure, a locationally agnostic state renewable
portfolio standard does not raise concerns under the Constitution’s Commerce
Clause. Expressly location-based, in-state or in-region requirements and pref-
erences, however, bring state portfolio standards in conflict with the dormant
Commerce Clause. Delivery-based and other facially neutral, functional re-
quirements and preferences offer a less constitutionally controversial option for
state renewable portfolio standards to capture some, albeit not all of the eco-
nomic benefits associated with renewable energy deployment. These and other
limitations on the ability of state policymakers to adopt renewable portfolio
standards that internalize the economic benefits of renewables in-state have
prompted widespread scholarly skepticism over the policy’s constitutional via-
bility leading a number of environmental scholars to call for reform of modern
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
1. Locationally Agnostic State Renewable Portfolio Standards
State renewable portfolio standards that do not favor in-state generators or
otherwise discriminate against out-of-state generators, manufacturers, or others
138. See Nichols v. Markell, No. CV 12-777-CJB, 2014 WL 1509780, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 17,
2014).
139. Id. at *2.
140. In fact, Delaware offered several additional incentives to attract the new fuel cell manufac-
turing plant, including $16.5 million from the Delaware Strategic Fund and a rent-free
ground lease. Id.
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based on their location pass constitutional muster.141 Historically, states have
had jurisdiction over fuel choice, power generation portfolios, and resource de-
velopment within their respective energy economies.142 As FERC has noted:
As a general matter, states have broad powers under state law to di-
rect the planning and resource decisions of utilities under their juris-
diction. States may, for example, order utilities to build renewable
generators themselves, or deny certification of other types of facilities
if state law so permits. They also, assuming state law permits, may
order utilities to purchase renewable generation.143
The Energy Policy Act of 2005144 acknowledges state sovereignty over fuel
choice and generation portfolios insofar as it requires state regulators to consider
but not to adopt fuel diversity standards with a diverse range of fuels and tech-
nologies, including renewables.145 As further testament to pre-existing state au-
thority to adopt renewable portfolio standards, the Act relieves state regulators
of their obligation to consider these and other fuel diversity standards to the
extent that they have already done so.146 Finally, the Energy Policy Act of 2005
clarifies that none of its provisions prohibit states from adopting, pursuant to
state law, any standard or rule for electric utilities beyond the standards enu-
merated therein.147
2. State Renewable Portfolio Standards with Location-Based Requirements
and Preferences
Location-based requirements and other preferences for in-state generators,
manufacturers, or others come in a variety of forms. Some state renewable port-
folio standards, like that of Delaware,148 expressly mandate that only renewable
power generation facilities located within state borders will be eligible for the
141. See, e.g., Englese, supra note 33, at 986 (“[S]tate renewable quotas are constitutional.”); Rei- R
ter, supra note 67, at 65 (“Favoring renewable generation over fossil-fueled energy sources R
poses no dormant Commerce Clause issue.”); id. at 66 (“Neither the Public Utilities Regula-
tory Policies Act . . . nor the Federal Power Act . . . preempts states from favoring renewable
resources over conventional fossil fuel generation.”). See also Ferrey, supra note 67, at 182 R
(noting that only certain design characteristics of state RPS programs “raise dormant Com-
merce Clause issues”).
142. See, e.g., Mormann, supra note 1, at 1651; Ralls, supra note 38; Rossi, supra note 38. R
143. S. Cal. Edison Co. & San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 71 FERC ¶ 61269, 62080 (June 2,
1995).
144. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
145. See 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(12) (2012).
146. See 16 U.S.C. § 2622(d).
147. See 16 U.S.C. § 2627(b).
148. See supra notes 128–132 and accompanying text. R
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issuance of RECs for compliance with the state’s sourcing mandate.149 Others
use credit multipliers to grant more RECs and, hence, greater value to renewa-
ble power generated in-state.150 Instead of the generation facility’s location,
some state renewable portfolio standards afford preferential treatment to facili-
ties constructed with in-state labor or materials manufactured in-state.151
Whatever their regulatory design details, such in-state requirements and prefer-
ences may improve the political appeal of a state’s renewable energy sourcing
requirement,152 but do so at the expense of heightened vulnerability to dormant
Commerce Clause challenges. It may seem surprising that, to date, no court has
issued a decision on the merits regarding the constitutionality of location-based
requirements and preferences in state renewable portfolio standards. This seem-
ing lack of judicial clarity, however, should not be misconstrued as an indication
that the constitutionality of such provisions or, more precisely, the lack thereof
is in serious dispute. Rather, courts have not been given opportunity to issue a
substantive decision because state regulators have found ways to avoid fighting
what would be a losing battle. When challenged on dormant Commerce Clause
grounds, state regulators have either amended their respective renewable port-
folio standards to eliminate controversial location-based in-state requirements
and preferences153 or settled the case in question so as to avoid the stigma of a
judgment against their sourcing mandates.154 The closest to a judgment on the
merits comes in the form of a dictum from Judge Posner who, writing for the
Seventh Circuit, quipped:
Michigan’s first argument—that its [RPS] law forbids it to credit
wind power from out of state against the state’s required use of re-
newable energy by its utilities—trips over an insurmountable consti-
tutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce
clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-
state renewable energy.155
149. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §34-1432(e)(1) (2015); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3855/1-75(c)(3) (2016);
IND. CODE 8-1-37-12(b) (2016); 225 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.05(4)(a) (2016).
150. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 14-2-1806(D) (2015); 26 DEL. CODE § 356(a)(1), (b)–(e)
(2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 393.1030(1) (2012).
151. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 14-2-1806(E) (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 356
(d)–(e) (2016).
152. See Englese, supra note 33, at 986. R
153. See, e.g., Massachusetts’s emergency regulation to suspend its in-state generator require-
ments, supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text; Colorado’s elimination of its in-state gen- R
erator requirements, supra note 99 and accompanying text. R
154. See, e.g., Massachusetts’s settlement with TransCanada, supra note 89 and accompanying R
text; Delaware’s settlement with FuelCell Energy, supra note 132 and accompanying text. R
155. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir.
2013).
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Indeed, it seems hard to imagine a scenario in which a court asked to
judge the constitionality of a state renewable portfolio standard’s location-based
in-state requirements and preferences would not strike them down for violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause.156 Due to their facially discriminatory na-
ture, the pertinent provisions would be subject to strict scrutiny and struck
down unless the state can demonstrate that its regulation serves a compelling
state interest and that this interest could not be served as well by available non-
discriminatory means.157 The Supreme Court has interpreted the latter “excuse”
for a state’s facial discrimination against interstate commerce very restric-
tively.158 Only on one occasion was the Court persuaded that a state’s facially
discriminatory regulation was justified by a legimitate purpose that could not be
achieved through less discriminatory measures. In that particular instance, the
Court accepted Maine’s regulation banning out-of-state imports of live baitfish
as the least discriminatory means to protect the state’s fragile fisheries from
parasites and invasive species.159 The Supreme Court has made it clear, how-
ever, that “[s]hielding in-state industries from out-of-state competition is al-
most never a legitimate local purpose, and state laws that amount to ‘simple
economic protectionism’ consequently have been subject to a ‘virtually per se
rule of invalidity.’ ”160 As illustrated by the example of Delaware’s treatment of
energy from fuel cells,161 in-state requirements and preferences in state renewa-
ble portfolio standards tend to be driven primarily by economic concerns and,
hence, would not pass muster under the “legimitate purpose” test.162
156. See Endrud, supra note 34, at 270 (“[A] requirement that the renewable energy used to meet R
a state’s RPS obligation be generated within the state itself . . . would almost certainly be
struck down”); Englese, supra note 33, at 1009–10 (“[A] pure location requirement, requir- R
ing energy providers to obtain a certain amount of renewable energy from in-state resources,
would fail under the per se test.”); Ferrey, supra note 134, at 106 (“The state can regulate R
RECs, but it must not discriminate based solely on geography.”); Patrick R. Jacobi, Renewa-
ble Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: How States Can Stop Worrying and
Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 VT. L. REV. 1079, 1111 (2006) (“In-state,
location-based requirements in a purely REC-based RPS are per se invalid.”); Stiles, supra
note 134, at 64 (“Any requirement that the energy used to meet the RPS threshold must be R
generated within the state itself would almost certainly be found to violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause.”).
157. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
336 (1979)).
158. See, e.g., Lee & Duane, supra note 33, at 308 (“States rarely meet this level of scrutiny.”). R
159. See Maine, 477 U.S. at 151 (“The evidence in this case amply supports the District Court‘s
findings that Maine’s ban on the importation of live baitfish serves legitimate local purposes
that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives.”).
160. Id. at 148 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
161. See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text. R
162. But see Lee & Duane, supra note 33, at 322–23 (arguing that credit multipliers for in-state R
generation could be upheld under West Lynn Creamery).
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One commentator has suggested that states find themselves on constitu-
tionally safer ground when geographic requirements and preferences in their
renewable portfolio standards are based on in-region rather than in-state loca-
tion.163 The overwhelming majority of scholars, however, agree that such provi-
sions, while not discriminating against all other forty-nine states in the union,
would still be considered facially discriminatory by the courts regarding all out-
of-region states and, hence, be struck down for violation of the dormant Com-
merce Clause.164 Indeed, the Supreme Court has, in a different context, made it
clear that scaling discriminatory in-state requirements up to in-region require-
ments makes them no less facially discriminatory and, hence, no less trouble-
some for the purposes of dormant Commerce Clause review.165
3. State Renewable Portfolio Standards with Delivery-Based and Other
Functional Requirements and Preferences
Like California,166 a number of states have included provisions in their
renewable portfolio standards167 that require renewable energy credit-earning
electricity to be delivered into their state or regional power grid.168 Others re-
163. See Griffin, supra note 33, at 160–65 (arguing that Massachusetts’s facially discriminatory in- R
region location requirement for RPS-eligible generators might be upheld by a court for serv-
ing a legitimate local purpose that could not be adequately served by non-discriminatory
means). For examples of regional location requirements and preferences, see D.C. CODE
§ 34-1432(e) (2012); 26 DEL. CODE § 352(6) (2016); MD PUB. UTIL. § 7-701(n)(2)
(2013).
164. See, e.g., Endrud, supra note 34, at 271 (“[I]n-region location requirements, while not dis- R
criminatory towards certain neighboring states, would still be facially discriminatory against
the remainder of states and would therefore also be invalidated.”); Jacobi, supra note 156, at R
1132 (“[I]n-region limits and adjacency limits still exclude the majority of states in the
United States based purely on location.”); NANCY RADER & SCOTT HEMPLING, THE
RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, at A-1 (2001) (“The state
law would still discriminate, facially, against other states.”); Reiter, supra note 67, at 51 (“Re- R
gional, rather than explicit in-state preferences, likewise will not escape condemnation under
the Commerce Clause.”).
165. See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985)
(“There can be little dispute that the dormant Commerce Clause would prohibit a group of
States from establishing a system of regional banking by excluding bank holding companies
from outside the region if Congress had remained completely silent on the subject.”).
166. See supra notes 117–121 and accompanying text. R
167. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11(e)(2) (2016); MD PUB. UTIL. § 7-701(k)(2)
(2013).
168. These delivery requirements are often defined in terms of the Independent System Operator
(“ISO”) or Regional Transmission Operator (“RTO”) that the state in question belongs to.
For more background on ISOs and RTOs, see Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky,
Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 804, 817 (2013).
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quire or reward energy generated using certain types of technologies169 or pro-
ject sizes.170 When the requirements and preferences of state renewable
portfolio standards are defined in these functional terms they raise significantly
fewer concerns under the dormant Commerce Clause than when defined in
geographic terms, such as the in-state location requirements above.171 A state
sourcing requirement’s carve-outs or credit multipliers for solar and other re-
newable energy technologies apply to in-state and out-of-state generators alike.
The same is true of requirements or preferences for renewable energy coming
from distributed generation and other project sizes. In the absence of any facial
discrimination, these provisions would not be subject to strict scrutiny but,
rather, the more lenient Pike balancing test.172 Under this test, evenhanded reg-
ulation for a legitimate local purpose with merely incidental effects on interstate
commerce will be upheld “unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”173 To be sure, a solar
carve-out such as that in New Mexico’s renewable portfolio standard174 could be
construed as placing a burden on renewable power entrepreneurs in Washing-
ton state where the solar resource quality is considerably lower.175 A court would
be hard-pressed, however, to consider this burden as “clearly excessive” com-
pared to the state renewable portfolio standard’s putative local benefits of im-
proved reliability and supply diversity.176 A corollary to their relatively low
169. See, e.g., 4 COLO. CODE REGS 723-3-3654(e) (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a
(2014); D.C. CODE § 34-1432(c) (2015); 26 DEL. CODE § 354(a) (2010); 20 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 3855/1-75(c)(1) (2016); MD PUB. UTIL. § 7-703(b) (2013); 225 MASS. CODE
REGS. 14.05(4) (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 393.1030(1) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
704.7821(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2016); N.M. Code R. § 17.9.572.7 (LexisNexis 2016) (imple-
menting N.M. STAT. ANN., § 62-16-4 (2016)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:4(II)
(2006); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-2.4(b) (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(2)
(LexisNexis 2016); 73 PA. STAT. § 1648.3(b)(2) (2006).
170. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R14-2-1805(B), R14-2-1806(F) (2015); D.C. CODE § 34-
1432(e)(1) (2015); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3855/1-75(1) (2016).
171. See supra Part II.B.2.
172. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See also supra note 79 and accom- R
panying text.
173. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
443 (1960)).
174. See N.M. CODE R. § 17.9.572.7 (LexisNexis 2016) (implementing N.M. STAT. ANN.,
§ 62-16-4 (2016)).
175. See KRISTEN ARDANI & ROBERT MARGOLIS, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2010 SOLAR TECH-
NOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 53 (2011).
176. See also ELEFANT & HOLT, supra note 134, at 12 (“DG or solar set-asides impose minimal R
burdens on commerce . . . .”); Reiter, supra note 67, at 66 (“[A]s long as they are not favoring R
in-state over out-of-state competitors, states may also favor particular renewable technolo-
gies over others without running afoul of the Commerce Clause.”). In addition to these
primarily economic benefits, renewable portfolio standards also create environmental bene-
fits. While climate benefits derived from fewer greenhouse gas emissions accrue to the world
at large, other environmental benefits accrue at a more localized scale. See supra note 135. R
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burden on interstate commerce and, hence, minimal vulnerability to dormant
Commerce Clause challenges, however, is that technology- and size-based re-
quirements and preferences are less effective at ensuring that all, or even most,
of the economic benefits associated with renewable energy will be enjoyed in-
state.
Delivery requirements—into the state or regional grid—for energy to be
compliant with a state’s sourcing mandate offer greater prospects for capturing
more of renewable energy’s economic benefits within the state. With their
evenhanded application to in-state and out-of-state generators alike, such re-
quirements would also be subject to Pike balancing. The costs for out-of-state
or out-of-region generators to connect to the grid in question likely represent a
greater incidental burden on interstate commerce than those imposed by the
above requirements and preferences based on a project’s technology or size.177
Nevertheless, the prevailing view among scholars178 and regulators179 appears to
be that these delivery costs would not be considered clearly excessive relative to
a state renewable portfolio standard’s putative benefits, hence, passing muster
under the dormant Commerce Clause.
4. Scholarly Calls for Reform of Commerce Clause Doctrine
Calls for reform of the courts’ dormant Commerce Clause doctrine are
neither new nor limited to the context of state renewable portfolio standards.180
Widespread concern over the constitutional viability of these policies, however,
177. See also ELEFANT & HOLT, supra note 134, at 12 (“an out-of-state developer may face added R
cost to connect”).
178. See id. (“[C]ommentators generally agree that in-state and regional delivery requirements
will survive commerce clause review.”); Endrud, supra note 34, at 273; Anne Havemann, R
Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with
the Federal Constitution, 71 MD. L. REV. 848, 885 (2012) (“[T]he state should keep its
REC-based system but emphasize the delivery of benefits over the location of the energy
source.”); Jacobi, supra note 156, at 1129 (“Since eligibility is based on benefit delivery and R
not location, these statutes do not discriminate and should survive a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge.”); RADER & HEMPLING, supra note 164, at A-4. R
179. In its order denying rehearing of Cowlitz County’s complaint over the California RPS’s
requirement that eligible energy be delivered into the California ISO, the California Public
Utilities Commission noted, in passing, that the delivery requirement would pass muster
under the Pike balancing test. See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text. R
180. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 437
(1982) (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause should be abandoned in favor of using
the Privileges and Immunities Clause as the principal safeguard against state protectionist
measures); Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate Dis-
crimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 576 (1997)
(arguing that dormant Commerce Clause doctrine should focus on state protectionism and
consider inter-state discrimination as a secondary concern only, abandoning the current
practice of virtual per se invalidity of discriminatory measures).
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has produced a veritable chorus of calls for reform specifically related to renew-
able portfolio standards. One commentator, for instance, urges revision of the
facial discrimination test to acknowledge “second-best reasoning” where states
seek to correct market failures related to natural resources and to expand the
market participant exception181 for states seeking to to prevent the loss of envi-
ronmental public goods funded by state consumer investments.182 Another
commentator advocates for a departure from the strict scrutiny standard in
favor of a more lenient standard of scrutiny to permit state experimentation for
motives other than bald economic protectionism.183 Others argue that, in recog-
nition of the instrumental usefulness of renewable energy regulations, courts
should expand the intermediate scrutiny standard applied in First Amendment
and Equal Protection cases to dormant Commerce Clause inquiries related to
state renewable portfolio standards.184 The same commentators also suggest ex-
panding the market participant exception185 to include states when regulating
renewable energy due to their heavy involvement with electric utilities, effec-
tively expanding the Fourteenth Amendment’s entanglement rationale to dor-
mant Commerce Clause inquiries.186 Others call for viewing dormant
Commerce Clause cases through a climate-change lens to reveal that some
seemingly discriminatory state treatment of like products, in fact, constitutes
differential treatment of different products, including renewable energy.187 Per-
haps in acknowledgment that courts are unlikely to modify existing dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine solely for the purposes of state renewable portfolio
standards, one commentator calls on Congress to pass legislation with express
authorization for such state renewable energy sourcing mandates that include
preferential treatment for in-state generation.188
In the following two sections, this Article makes the case that such sweep-
ing—and improbable—reforms are not necessary. State policymakers have
other means of jointly promoting renewable energy deployment and in-state
economic development without running afoul of the Constitution’s dormant
Commerce Clause.
181. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. R
182. See Engel, supra note 33, at 324, 334. R
183. See Kalen, supra note 33, at 424–25.
184. See Lee & Duane, supra note 33, at 355–58. R
185. For precedent related to the market participant exception, see supra note 78. R
186. See Lee & Duane, supra note 33, at 359–60. R
187. See Barsa & Dana, supra note 33, at 70–71. R
188. See Endrud, supra note 34, at 281. R
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE FEED-IN TARIFFS
Compared to over three decades of experience with renewable portfolio
standards,189 feed-in tariffs are a much more recent addition to the U.S. energy
policy landscape.190 Despite their relative novelty, state feed-in tariff programs
have already become the target of constitutional challenges. Recent litigation
suggests that state-level feed-in tariffs are particularly vulnerable to Supremacy
Clause challenges (infra A.). The constitutional risk profile of these policies,
therefore, depends primarily on the likelihood that their particular design fea-
tures are preempted by federal law (infra B.). In contrast to renewable portfolio
standards,191 state-level feed-in tariffs tend not to raise concerns under the dor-
mant Commerce Clause.192
States are limited in their discretion to adopt feed-in tariff policies to pro-
mote renewable energy deployment by the looming threat that their efforts may
be subject to federal preemption under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.193
The Supreme Court has continuously attempted to clarify and refine the scope
and requirements of federal preemption of state law under the Supremacy
Clause.194 The court has summarized this preemptive effect to apply “when
Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to preempt state
189. Iowa adopted the first-ever renewable portfolio standard in the United States in 1983. See
Davies, supra note 44, at 1357.
190. The first-ever feed-in tariff in the United States was adopted by the city of Gainesville, FL
in 2009. See CORY, supra note 52, at 9 and accompanying text. R
191. See supra Part II.
192. The absence of Commerce Clause challenges directed at state feed-in tariffs may be the
result of their relative novelty but could also be attributed to important doctrinal differences
between state-level feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards. Portfolio standards
with location-specific requirements and preferences impose a significant burden on interstate
commerce by discriminating against out-of-state generators. See supra notes 155–165 and R
accompanying text. In contrast, state feed-in tariffs merely guarantee above-market rates to
eligible generators within the state’s jurisdiction. According to the Supreme Court, “[a] pure
subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce,
but merely assists local business.” W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199
(1994) (alteration in original). To be sure, feed-in tariffs tend to be financed by ratepayers,
not taxpayers, but their purpose to assist local business is the same as that of a subsidy funded
out of general tax revenues. Moreover, PURPA expressly authorizes states to adopt feed-in
tariff policies to support local generation of renewable and other eligible energy. See infra
Part III.2.
193. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding.”
194. See, e.g., Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 500 (1996); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v, Fed.
Commc’n Comm’n, 476 U.S. 355, 368–69 (1986); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc, v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 65–68 (1941).
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law, when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law,
where compliance with both federal and state law is in effect physically impos-
sible, where there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation, where
Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of reg-
ulation and leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law, or where
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full objectives of Congress.”195 In the case of state-level feed-in tariff programs,
the threat of preemption looms large due to the FPA’s general assignment of
authority over the underlying wholesale transactions to federal, rather than state
regulators (infra 1.). State-level feed-in tariffs may, however, evade preemption
insofar as they are adopted pursuant to the limited wholesale rate-setting au-
thority afforded to states under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(infra 2.).
1. The Federal Power Act of 1935
In its 1928 Attleboro decision, the Supreme Court curtailed the states’ abil-
ity to regulate sales of electricity across state lines holding that the sale of elec-
tricity to an out-of-state buyer constituted interstate commerce within the
purview of the Commerce Clause.196 A state public utility commission’s rate
order for such a power sale was found to impose a burden on interstate com-
merce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.197 To fill the resulting
regulatory void, also referred to as the “Attleboro gap,”198 Congress passed the
Federal Power Act of 1935.199 Among other things, the FPA vested the Federal
Power Commission, the predecessor of today’s FERC, with exclusive authority
to regulate “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”200
Section 201 of the FPA defines the “sale of electric energy at wholesale” as
a “sale of electric energy to any person for resale.”201 Feed-in tariffs require
electric utilities to purchase the electricity output of eligible generators at pre-
determined rates.202 The utilities, in turn, sell that electricity along with the
195. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 368–69.
196. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 86 (1927). For a
critical review, see Sam Kalen, Muddling Through Modern Energy Policy: The Dormant Com-
merce Clause and Unmasking the Illusion of an Attleboro Line, 24 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (forth-
coming 2017).
197. See Attleboro, 273 U.S. at 89.
198. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 31; New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 20 R
(2002).
199. 16 U.S.C. § 791 (1935) et seq. See also Robert R. Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defin-
ing Federal and State Regulation of Today’s Electric Grid, 36 ENERGY L.J. 203, 204 (2015)
(explaining the genesis of the FPA).
200. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012).
201. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d).
202. See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\41-1\HLE106.txt unknown Seq: 32  5-MAY-17 11:45
220 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 41
power that they generate and purchase from other generators to their custom-
ers. The sale of electricity from renewable power generators to electric utilities,
therefore, falls squarely within the FPA’s definition of a wholesale transaction
over electric energy.
FERC’s rate-setting authority under the FPA further requires that the
wholesale transaction in question take place in interstate commerce.203 States
and utilities have sought to limit the jurisdictional reach of FERC’s rate-setting
authority by asserting the (predominantly) intrastate nature of certain wholesale
transactions.204 Courts and FERC alike, however, have consistently defended
and, in some cases, expanded FERC’s broad jurisdiction over wholesale trans-
actions of electric energy, pointing to the electrical grid’s interconnectedness
across state lines and the comingling of in-state with out-of-state electricity as
sufficient to warrant a transaction’s qualification as interstate commerce.205
Two recent Supreme Court decisions indicate some willingness to inter-
pret the statutory scope of state authority over energy regulation in a more
expansive fashion, albeit in the context of demand response206 and state anti-
trust regulation.207 Most recently, however, the Supreme Court held that a Ma-
ryland program providing a long-term contract for differences for a new in-
state natural gas plant to make up for any shortcomings in the generator’s sales
on the wholesale power market is preempted by the FPA because it contravenes
the Act’s assignment of exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale rates to FERC.208
While the Court expressly excludes other direct state-level subsidies, such as
feed-in tariffs from the scope of its holding,209 its decision serves as a reminder
203. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b).
204. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972); Fed. Power
Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964).
205. See Fla. Power & Light, 404 U.S. at 462; S. Cal. Edison, 376 U.S. at 209. See also New York
v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 17 (2004) (holding broadly that, in accor-
dance with FERC’s open-access Order No. 888, “unbundled retail transmissions targeted by
FERC are indeed transmissions of ‘electric energy in interstate commerce,’ because of the
nature of the national grid.”). While there is no seamless national power grid, two of the
three primary power grids, also referred to as interconnects, serve multiple states. See NERC,
North American Electric Reliability Corporation Interconnections, https://perma.cc/5HPR-
RZ4P.
206. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
See also Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1783 (2016) (making the case that recent Supreme Court precedent expands
federal jurisdiction over the electric industry); Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy
Federalism, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (interpreting recent Supreme Court precedent
as indication for a gradual shift away from dual sovereignty and toward more concurrent
jurisdiction over energy regulation).
207. See ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015).
208. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016).
209. Id. at 1299.
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of the FPA’s strict division of rate-setting authority between federal and state
regulators.
As a result of FERC’s plenary and exclusive210 rate-setting authority for
wholesale transactions under the FPA, a state-level feed-in tariff that mandates
utilities to purchase renewable power at state-mandated rates would be subject
to federal preemption under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause—unless the
state adopted its feed-in tariff in accordance with the limited wholesale rate-
setting authority afforded to states under PURPA.211
2. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
Congress passed PURPA in response to the 1970s oil crisis to fuel the
domestic development of alternative sources of energy, including renewables.212
At the time, electricity markets across the United States and around the world
were monopolistic or oligopolistic at best and often run by government-owned
utilities. PURPA set the regulatory stage for pioneering entrepreneurs to enter
the nation’s electricity markets and sell the power they produce from micro-
generation, cogeneration and renewable power plants over the grid.
Long before the first serious attempts at large-scale deregulation of the
electricity sector, PURPA allowed for the exemption of eligible cogeneration
and renewable power generators, defined as Qualifying Facilities (“QFs”), from
certain federal and state public utility regulation.213 Moreover, PURPA granted
these power producers access to the grid and required public utility companies
to purchase the incoming producers’ electricity at non-discriminatory rates
based on the utilities’ avoided cost.214 While these rates allowed efficiently run
cogeneration and some biomass plants to operate at a profit, they were not
210. See also Rossi, supra note 206, at 7 (highlighting the critical distinction between broad or R
plenary jurisdiction and exclusive jurisdiction, both of which may but need not necessarily
coincide).
211. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047, 61,337 (2010) (“While Congress has
authorized a role for States in setting wholesale rates under PURPA, Congress has not au-
thorized other opportunities for States to set rates for wholesale sales in interstate commerce
by public utilities, or indicated that the Commission’s actions or inactions can give States
this authority.”).
212. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3119. See also
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750 (1982).
213. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.601 (2016). For the eligibility criteria of QFs, see 18 C.F.R.
§§ 292.204–05 (2016).
214. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012). For a detailed discussion of PURPA and its relevance to
energy entrepreneurs pioneering in renewables and cogeneration, see Robert N. Danziger,
Renewable Energy Resources and Cogeneration: Community Systems and Grid Interaction as a
Public Utility Enterprise, 2 WHITTIER L. REV. 81, 94 (1979); Steven Ferrey et al., Fire and
Ice: World Renewable Energy and Carbon Control Mechanisms Confront Constitutional Barriers,
20 DUKE ENVT. L. & POL’Y F. 125, 140 (2010); Grinlinton & Paddock, supra note 58, R
at 960.
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nearly high enough to cover the costs of producing electricity from then-nas-
cent renewable energy technologies such as solar or wind.
As advanced as the regulatory framework introduced by PURPA was, it
lacked a comprehensive and coherent policy framework providing for the finan-
cial incentives necessary to promote the large-scale deployment of renewable
energy. Instead, financial support for most renewables was as intermittent as
their energy output. This policy patchwork led to a series of boom-and-bust
cycles that put many early renewable energy entrepreneurs out of business and
left the industry with a doubtful reputation.215 The great opportunity in the
1970s and 1980s that PURPA had created to give the United States a head
start into the global clean energy race was missed.216 Still, PURPA continues to
provide the applicable regulatory framework for the sale of electricity to the grid
by most incoming renewable power generators. In fact, PURPA may well cast
the deciding vote on the constitutionality and, with it, the long-term success of
state-level feed-in tariffs as drivers of renewable energy deployment.
The rates at which electric utilities are required to purchase power from
QFs under PURPA are determined in one of two ways. The first option is for
the QF to negotiate with the utility to sell its electricity at market-based
rates.217 For renewable power generators and other QFs, this approach has the
theoretical advantage that such negotiated rates may account for the higher
production costs of electricity from solar, wind, and other emerging renewable
energy technologies.218 In practice, however, negotiated rates are unlikely to
cover the full cost of renewable power since utilities tend to use their market
power to pay the lowest rate possible for a QF’s power.219
215. See MENDONC¸A ET AL., supra note 42, at 172. For a more recent discussion of the need to R
break out of recurring boom-and-bust cycles, see JESSE JENKINS ET AL., BREAKTHROUGH
INSTITUTE, BEYOND BOOM & BUST: PUTTING CLEAN TECH ON A PATH TO SUBSIDY
INDEPENDENCE (2012).
216. Just how far ahead of its time Congress was with the passage of PURPA can be seen by
taking a glance at some of today’s leading nations in renewables deployment. Germany, for
instance, did not pass its first act of legislation granting non-utility producers of electricity
grid access (Electricity Feed-In Law) until 1991—thirteen years after PURPA. It took Ger-
many only two more years, however, to recognize and remedy the dilemma of missing finan-
cial incentives for electricity generation from renewables through further legislation to
actively promote the deployment of renewables, i.e., the Full Cost Rates Law of 1993. See,
e.g., Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV.
937, 943 (2014); Haas et al., supra note 42, at 1014. R
217. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.301(b) (2016). See also FERC Order No. 697-A, Market-Based Rates
for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities,
123 FERC ¶ 61,055 (2008).
218. Such negotiated rates are not subject to market-based rate approval by FERC and may ex-
ceed PURPA’s statutory cap of avoided cost. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2012).
219. For accounts of this utility practice, see, e.g., Ferrey et al., supra note 214, at 140; Miles, R
supra note 29, at 1268. R
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The second option is for the QF to sell its power at a rate that the state,
through its public utility commission, has pre-determined. PURPA, thus,
grants states limited authority to set rates for wholesale electricity sales between
QFs and utilities. Implementation of a feed-in tariff based on rate-setting au-
thority under PURPA, therefore, may allow a state to evade federal preemption
for violation of FERC’s rate-setting authority under the FPA. There is just one
problem: State-mandated rates under PURPA may not exceed the utility’s
avoided cost.220 In the words of Congress, rates may not be higher than the
“incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy.”221 The Act
goes on to define this incremental cost as “the cost to the electric utility of the
electric energy which, but for the purchase from [the QF], such utility would
generate or purchase from another source.”222 Historically, this avoided-cost cap
has been determined based on the lowest-cost alternative power source—usu-
ally coal-fired or, more recently, natural gas-fired electricity—and, hence,
would not be enough to cover the higher generation costs of emerging renewa-
ble energy technologies.
For state feed-in tariff programs to pass constitutional muster and effec-
tively drive the large-scale deployment of renewable energy, they would need to
establish rates that comply with PURPA’s avoided-cost cap and, at the same
time, manage to reflect the higher production costs of renewable energy genera-
tors.223 Situated at the intersection between federal and state regulatory author-
ity on the one hand and conventional and renewable energy on the other hand,
the proper meaning and determination of PURPA’s avoided-cost mandate has
long been controversial as the following cases illustrate.
A. Recent Litigation over State Feed-in Tariffs
While state feed-in tariff programs in their current form are a relatively
recent addition to the U.S. energy policy landscape, some earlier state policies
share similar design elements. To better appreciate the judicial history of to-
day’s feed-in tariff and earlier, “feed-in tariff-esque” policies, the following sur-
vey of relevant litigation therefore starts in the 1990s and, hence, well before
the dawn of the actual feed-in tariff era in the United States.
In 1995, FERC found a Connecticut statute requiring a local utility to
purchase power from a resources recovery facility to be preempted by PURPA
insofar as it established a purchase obligation at more than the utilities’ avoided
220. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b).
221. Id.
222. Id. § 824a-3(d).
223. For a list of the criteria that states have to consider when setting rates under PURPA, see 18
C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (2016). See also Grinlinton & Paddock, supra note 58, at 964. For a cost
comparison between emerging renewable energy and conventional energy, see LAZARD,
LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS–VERSION 8.0 (2014).
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cost.224 In its order denying reconsideration of Connecticut, FERC clarified that
a state cannot impose rates in excess of avoided cost on utilities even if the
generation facility has been exempted from the FPA’s ratemaking provisions
pursuant to FERC regulations.225
In its 1997 Midwest Power Systems decision, FERC found Iowa legislation
that mandated the state’s utilities to purchase electricity from certain types of
generating facilities to be generally consistent with the FPA and PURPA.226
However, the commission declared the legislation to be preempted by federal
law insofar as utilities were required to purchase power at rates above their
avoided cost.227
In July 2010, FERC issued a similar decision related to California’s feed-
in tariff under the state’s AB 1613 program to promote cogeneration facilities
that produce and sell both heat and power.228 In California Public Utilities Com-
mission, the commission summarized its previous precedents to clarify that a
program such as AB 1613 will be preempted by federal law, unless (i) the gen-
erators from which state utilities are required to purchase electricity are QFs
under PURPA and (ii) the mandated purchase price does not exceed the utili-
ties’ avoided cost.229 FERC further clarified that environmental concerns over
greenhouse gas emissions or climate change do not relieve state legislators from
their rate regulation limitations established by the FPA and PURPA, including
the avoided-cost cap.230 Citing section 201(b)(1) of the FPA231 Intervenor Sac-
ramento Municipal Utility District (“SMUD”) urged FERC to clarify that, due
to their intrastate nature, distribution-level feed-in tariff programs do not im-
plicate FERC’s rate setting jurisdiction.232 SMUD warned that a decision as-
serting FERC jurisdiction over all distribution-level power sales to utilities
would place millions of homeowners, farmers and businesses selling power from
rooftop solar panels or small wind turbines to their local utility under FERC’s
224. Connecticut, 70 FERC ¶ 61,012 at 61,029 (1995).
225. Connecticut, 71 FERC ¶ 61,035 at 61,153 (1995). For more information on exemption
from the FPA, see Order No. 671, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,203 (2006).
226. Midwest Power Systems, 78 FERC ¶ 61,067 at 61,246 (1997).
227. Id. at 61,244.
228. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2010).
229. Id. at 61,338.
230. See id.
231. In pertinent part, section 201(b)(1) reads “The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all
facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy, but shall not have jurisdiction, ex-
cept as specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter, over facili-
ties used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or
only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the
transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.” 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)
(2012).
232. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ at 61,336–37.
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reign.233 Denying SMUD’s request for clarification, FERC instead emphasized
that its “FPA authority to regulate sales for resale of electric energy and trans-
mission in interstate commerce by public utilities is not dependent on the loca-
tion of generation or transmission facilities, but rather on the definition of, as
particularly relevant here, wholesale sales contained in the FPA.”234
In October 2010, FERC issued a clarification of its July California Public
Utilities Commission decision to address uncertainty among the states created by
FERC’s 1995 SoCal Edison decision235 as to what alternative sources could be
lawfully considered for the determination of a utility’s avoided cost.236 In its
clarification, FERC acknowledged that “there is language in the SoCal Edison
proceeding that would seem to permit state commissions to base avoided costs
on ‘all sources able to sell to the utility,’ and other language that requires a state
commission to take into account ‘all sources’ (the latter being unmodified by
the phrase ‘able to sell to the utility’ used elsewhere).”237 Under FERC’s own
regulations for the implementation of PURPA, avoided cost rates may “differ-
entiate among [QFs that use] various technologies on the basis of the supply
characteristics of [these] different technologies.”238 Consequently, FERC
pointed out that its interpretation of PURPA and pertinent regulation does not
preclude a source-specific avoided cost rate structure.239 The commission went
on to clarify SoCal Edison as follows: “[I]f a state required a utility to purchase
10% of its energy needs from renewable [sources], then a natural gas-fired unit,
for example, would not be a source ‘able to sell’ to that utility for the specified
renewable resources segment of the utility’s energy needs, and thus would not
be relevant to determining avoided costs for that segment of the utility’s energy
needs.”240 Remarkably, FERC framed its illustrative examples to highlight that
its reasoning applies not only to the cogeneration facilities subject to Califor-
nia’s AB 1613 program before the Commission but also to renewable power
generators. The Commission proceeded to clarify that, stated more broadly,
“where a state requires a utility to procure a certain percentage of energy from
generators with certain characteristics, generators with those characteristics
233. Id. at 61,337.
234. Id. at 61,339 (citing Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 225 F.3d 667, 695–96 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1 (2002)); Detroit Edison Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 334 F.3d 48, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power &
Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972).
235. S. Cal. Edison Co., 71 FERC ¶ 61,269 at 62,075 (1995).
236. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 133 FERC ¶ 61,059 (2010).
237. Id. at 61,267.
238. Id. at 61,263 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c)(3)(i) (2010)).
239. Id. at 61,266.
240. Id. at 61,267.
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constitute the sources that are relevant to the determination of the utility’s
avoided cost for that procurement requirement.”241
If FERC had hoped that its California Public Utilities Commission clarifica-
tion would resolve all uncertainty and doubt as to the constitutionality of state-
level feed-in tariffs, the Commission’s hopes were sorely disappointed. In 2013,
Vermont-based Otter Creek Solar filed a petition for FERC enforcement ac-
tion against the Vermont Public Service Board arguing inter alia that the
source-specific avoided-cost determinations under Vermont’s feed-in tariff pro-
gram violated PURPA and the FPA.242 Exercising its discretion under section
210(h)(2)(A) PURPA,243 FERC declined to initiate an enforcement action
without assessing the merits of Otter Creek’s complaint244 and, in 2014, also
denied Otter Creek’s request for reconsideration.245
B. Sketching a Constitutional Risk Profile for State Feed-in Tariffs
Notwithstanding FERC’s declared goal of eliminating any uncertainty re-
garding the outer limits of preemption-proof state feed-in tariff programs, the
above series of precedents appears to have exacerbated legal uncertainty among
not only states but expert analysts and legal scholars, too. Yet, FERC’s Califor-
nia Public Utilities Commission precedent has, in fact, opened up a path for state
feed-in tariffs that offer high enough rates to effectively promote renewables
without falling victim to preemption under the Supremacy Clause. Some limi-
tations remain, however.
1. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s Workaround
In an attempt to remedy this uncertainty, the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (“NREL”) commissioned a study to evaluate the federal law con-
straints for state-level feed-in tariff policies and to explore possible solutions.246
The NREL study suggests that states relying on PURPA can circumvent the
avoided-cost cap for payment to QFs in one of three ways: First, states can
issue RECs that QFs can sell to utilities in addition to the electricity they feed
into the grid.247 These credits serve as proof that the utilities have met their
241. Id.
242. See Otter Creek Solar LLC, 143 FERC ¶ 61,282, 62,969 (2013).
243. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(h)(2)(A) (2012) (“The Commission may enforce the requirements
of subsection (f) against any State regulatory authority or nonregulated electric utility.”).
244. See Otter Creek Solar LLC, 143 FERC ¶ 61,282, 62,969 (2013).
245. See Otter Creek Solar LLC, 146 FERC ¶ 61,192, 61,837 (2014).
246. SCOTT HEMPLING ET AL., RENEWABLE ENERGY PRICES IN STATE-LEVEL FEED-IN TAR-
IFFS: FEDERAL LAW CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, REPORT NREL/TP-6A2-
47408 (2010).
247. Id. at 14.
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obligations under the state’s RPS.248 Second, states can provide QFs with cash
grants or pay them production-based incentives.249 Such subsidies could be
funded either by taxpayers through the general state budget or by ratepayers
through a so-called system benefits charge.250 The third option that NREL
found permissible under FERC precedent is to establish a purchase price in
excess of the utility’s avoided cost and to grant the utility tax credits equal to the
excess.251 In this scenario, however, NREL warns that the state must be wary of
changes in the utility’s avoided cost, such as those caused by price fluctuations
in the markets for coal, natural gas, and other fuel. If the premium afforded to
the QF were to exceed the tax credit’s value, it would constitute a violation of
PURPA and, ultimately, lead to preemption under the Supremacy Clause.252
The ingenuity of the aforementioned options not withstanding, they them-
selves raise a number of policy, regulatory, and financial challenges. Most im-
portantly, NREL’s trifecta of options is likely to impose significant transaction
costs on a fledgling industry that is already struggling with higher technology
and financing costs than its competitors.253
2. Sustained Scholarly Skepticism over State Feed-in Tariffs
Before FERC’s 2010 orders related to California’s AB 1613 program, the
constitutionality of state-level feed-in tariffs that offer high enough rates to
effectively promote renewable energy was in serious doubt. In fact, the scholarly
community displayed a rare moment of unity in its assessment that such feed-in
tariff programs would almost inevitably be subject to federal preemption under
the Supremacy Clause. Remarkably, scholarly skepticism over states’ ability to
craft promotionally effective, yet preemption-proof feed-in tariffs persists even
after FERC’s California Public Utilities Commission clarification.
Prior to FERC’s October 2010 California Public Utilities Commission clari-
fication, the scholarly community was virtually united in its assessment that
states could not adopt feed-in tariff rates that were high enough to effectively
248. For the states’ authorization to create REC regimes, see supra Part II.B.1. See also American
Ref-Fuel Co., 105 FERC ¶ 61,004, 61,007 (2003) (acknowledging state authority over
RECs created under a state RPS).
249. HEMPLING ET AL., supra note 246, at 16–17 (citing CGE Fulton, 70 FERC ¶ 61,290 R
(1995)).
250. The states’ authorization to grant such direct payments to producers of electricity from
renewables was confirmed in CGE Fulton, 70 FERC ¶ 61,290 (1995).
251. HEMPLING ET AL., supra note 246, at 18. R
252. Cf. CGE Fulton, 70 FERC ¶ 61,290, 61,844 (1995).
253. For an account of the renewable energy industry’s technological and financial challenges, see
generally, FELIX MORMANN & DAN REICHER, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, SMARTER FI-
NANCE FOR CLEANER ENERGY: OPEN UP MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS (MLPS)
AND REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) TO RENEWABLE ENERGY (2012).
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promote renewable energy without falling victim to federal preemption.254 The
avoided-cost cap imposed on states’ limited PURPA authority to set wholesale
rates was considered an insurmountable obstacle. Ironically, the very instrument
that had originally been conceived to promote renewables and other alternative
energy sources had turned into a major roadblock along the clean energy race:
“[W]hile the goals underlying PURPA are much the same as the purpose of
state feed-in tariffs, the requirement that rates for mandated PURPA purchases
not exceed the utility’s avoided cost jeopardizes the goals underlying feed-in
tariffs because such tariffs are designed to pay a premium for renewable en-
ergy.”255 Others classified the avoided-cost cap and feed-in tariff rates that cover
a renewable power generator’s cost while offering a reasonable profit as “mutu-
ally exclusive concepts.”256 In sum, “[a]ny theoretical feed-in tariff proposal, in
order to be effective, would have to require prices well above purchasing utili-
ties’ avoided costs, and therefore would be subject to a FPA challenge by rate-
payers or utilities.”257
Even after FERC’s California Public Utilities Commission orders,258 large
portions of the scholarly community appear not to appreciate the full scope of
the latitude that the Commission has recognized for state implementation of
feed-in tariffs. Since FERC’s 2010 rulings, a number of scholars have voiced
their sustained skepticism over the constitutionality of state feed-in tariffs that
offer rates high enough to cover the costs of emerging renewable energy tech-
nologies.259 Despite FERC’s express approval of source-specific avoided-cost
calculations,260 most commentators have little faith in the states’ ability to adopt
effective, yet preemption-proof feed-in tariff programs. While granting states
“slightly more discretion,” the California Public Utilities Commission orders are
perceived to “significantly limit a state’s ability to mimic the methods and re-
sults” that have made feed-in tariff policies so successful outside the United
254. See, e.g., Ferrey et al., supra note 214, at 181; Teresa E. Morton & Jeffrey M. Peabody, Feed- R
in Tariffs: Misfits in the Federal and State Regulatory Regime?, 23 THE ELEC. J. 17 (2010);
Bradley Motl, Reconciling German-Style Feed-in Tariffs with PURPA, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 742
(2010–2011); John Perkins, Overcoming Jurisdictional Obstacles to Feed-in Tariffs in the
United States, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 97 (2009–2010); David Yaffe, Are State Re-
newable Feed-in Tariff Initiatives Truly Throttled by Federal Statutes After the FERC Califor-
nia Decision?, 23 THE ELEC. J. 9 (2010).
255. Morton & Peabody, supra note 254, at 19. R
256. Motl, supra note 254, at 753. R
257. Ferrey et al., supra note 214, at 201. R
258. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2010); Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 133
FERC ¶ 61,059 (2010).
259. See, e.g., Bloom et al., supra note 31, at 27; Dorsi, supra note 31, at 176; Ferrey, supra note R
31, at 90; Kelly, supra note 31, at 732; Rossi, supra note 31, at 249–50; Weissman, supra note R
31, at 356–57. R
260. See infra Part III.B.3.
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States.261 Similarly, there is concern that state-level feed-in tariffs “could only
match the level required by other policies.”262 Another commentator reads Cali-
fornia Public Utilities Commission as the “definitive ruling on state feed-in tariffs
that made crystal clear their constitutional limits.”263 According to these limits,
feed-in tariffs “do not pass constitutional muster under the U.S. Constitution
when implemented by states.”264 A recent article by feed-in tariff expert Lincoln
Davies succinctly sums up the prevailing scholary skepticism: “Because the
Constitution declares federal law supreme, both PURPA and the FPA effec-
tively prevent states from adopting feed-in tariffs.”265 More moderate critics of
FERC conclude that “[a]t the very least, it has raised the regulatory hurdles for
many participants in FIT projects.”266 Others urge to reinterpret PURPA’s
avoided-cost mandate as a “preemption floor” rather than the current “ceiling
price preemption approach.”267 Some, finally, suggest resolving these issues
through federal legislation that expressly permits state-level feed-in tariffs.268
3. FERC Guidance for Preemption-Proof State Feed-in Tariffs
The sustained scholarly skepticism over states’ ability to adopt feed-in tar-
iffs that effectively promote renewable energy without running afoul of the
Supremacy Clause is only partly warranted. FERC has, at last, opened up a
path forward allowing states to use their PURPA authority to implement feed-
in tariff policies that are effective yet preemption-proof. Some uncertainty and
limitations regarding the precise scope of state latitude persist, however.
a. Rates Based on Two-Tiered Avoided-Cost Calculus
FERC’s California Public Utilities Commission clarification has opened the
door for state feed-in tariffs under PURPA to establish higher rates for electric-
ity from renewables so long as (i) there is a state mandate, such as an RPS, that
261. Kelly, supra note 31, at 763. See also Ferrey, supra note 31, at 115–16 (“[S]till a real limita- R
tion pursuant to the Federal Power Act and the Filed Rate Doctrine applying the Supremacy
Clause, as this PURPA avoided cost cannot exceed the most economical cost avoided by the
utility finding the best option for this particular type of power from anywhere deliverable to
its grid.”).
262. Dorsi, supra note 31, at 189. See also Ferrey, supra note 31, at 117 (“This FERC 2010 order R
and clarification still preempts the European-style and to-date U.S. state calculations of high
feed-in tariffs.”).
263. Ferrey, supra note 134, at 107. R
264. Id. at 107, 110 (noting further that FIT programs “typically exceed substantially utility-
avoided costs”).
265. Davies, supra note 31, at 57. R
266. Bloom et al., supra note 31, at 27. R
267. Rossi, supra note 31, at 256.
268. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 31, at 772–73; Weissman, supra note 31, at 360–61. R
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requires utilities to procure a certain percentage of electricity from renewable
sources, and (ii) the established rate does not exceed the avoided cost for these
renewables.269 Through these requirements, FERC not only pays homage to
states’ historic sovereignty over fuel choice,270 but essentially acts as matchmaker
between state-level feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards. Contrary
to the literature’s long-standing view that both policy instruments are mutually
exclusive,271 FERC effectively requires a state to adopt a renewable portfolio
standard before that state can use its PURPA authority to adopt a feed-in tariff
with rates that are high enough to effectively promote renewable energy. In its
most simple form, this combination of renewable portfolio standard and feed-in
tariff would allow the state to consider only renewable sources in calculating the
utility’s avoided cost of generation or procurement.272 Utilities would no longer
be able to object to state-mandated purchase rates for solar or wind electricity
based on the availability of cheaper electricity fueled by coal or natural gas.
FERC has made clear that when a state renewable portfolio standard requires a
certain portion of the state’s electricity to come from renewables, coal, natural
gas and other non-renewable sources, including nuclear, cannot be considered
for purposes of determining a utility’s avoided cost.273 This renewables-based
avoided cost calculus, in turn, determines the maximum feed-in tariff rate that
the state can set under PURPA. Already, some twenty-nine states, three U.S.
territories, and the District of Columbia have adopted renewable portfolio stan-
dards274 and, hence, are ready to adopt feed-in tariffs that guarantee renewable
power generators rates above those required when considering the current least-
cost fossil fuel options.
269. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 133 FERC ¶ 61,059 at 61,267–68 (2010).
270. Cf. Ralls, supra note 38, at 454. See also supra Part II.B.1.; Rossi, supra note 38, at 1447–48. R
271. Originally, the literature—erroneously—viewed RPS and FIT policies as two mutually ex-
clusive policy instruments but has since come to embrace the possibility that both may, in
fact, work in tandem. See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Reconciling Renewable Portfolio Standards
and Feed-In Tariffs, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012) (reporting that, between
FIT and RPS policies, “states traditionally have chosen one tool or the other”); Rickerson et
al., supra note 51, at 79; Marc Ringel, Fostering T’he Use of Renewable Energies in the Euro- R
pean Union: the Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 RENEWABLE EN-
ERGY 1, 1, 14 (2006) (“Feed-in tariffs on the one side and green certificates on the other side
seem promising tools to foster renewable energies . . . . Whether feed-in tariffs or—more
likely—green certificates will be chosen is only a first, generic decision.”); Kwok L. Shum &
Chihiro Watanabe, Network Externality Perspective of Feed-in-Tariffs (FIT) Instruments—
Some Observations and Suggestions, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 3266, 3267 (2010) (“Different govern-
ments have attempted to use a price [FIT] vs. quantity [RPS] approach for renewable deploy-
ment.”). But see Mormann, supra note 1, at 1657 (proposing a model for joint R
implementation of RPS and FIT regimes toward better mitigation and allocation of investor
and regulatory risk).
272. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 133 FERC ¶ 61,059, 61,267 (2010).
273. Id.
274. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. R
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Yet, a bifurcated avoided-cost calculation that distinguishes between re-
newable and non-renewable sources of energy will not suffice to effectively pro-
mote a broad array of renewable energy technologies.275 After all, the point of
reference for the state’s avoided-cost determination would merely shift from the
current least-cost non-renewable option to the current least-cost renewable op-
tion. As a result, a two-tiered avoided-cost structure would primarily benefit
the current least-cost renewable energy technologies, presumably onshore wind
and certain biomass installations.276 As a result, a state feed-in tariff based on a
broad renewable portfolio standard that requires utilities to procure any renewa-
ble energy would not be sufficient to cover the cost of power generation from
technologies that are less mature today but hold promise for the future, such as
distributed solar photovoltaic, advanced geothermal or ocean tidal.277 Perhaps
this concern, albeit not voiced explicitly, is behind some of the sustained schol-
arly skepticism over promotionally effective yet preemption-proof state-level
feed-in tariffs. Such a view, however, would fail to recognize the full import of
FERC’s groundbreaking California Public Utilities Commission clarification.
b. Rates Based on Multi-Tiered Avoided-Cost Calculus
FERC’s endorsement of a source-specific avoided-cost structure contains
no express limitations as to the level of nuance that such a structure may incor-
porate. Rather, the Commission’s ruling and reasoning leave the door wide
open for states to structure their avoided-cost calculations not just along two
but multiple tiers. The California Public Utilities Commission clarification twice
emphasizes in identical wording that, “where a state requires a utility to procure
a certain percentage of energy from generators with certain characteristics, gen-
erators with those characteristics constitute the sources that are relevant to the
275. For the necessity to promote a suite of renewable energy technologies to support the timely
transition to a low-carbon economy, see NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 358 (2007); Staffan Jacobsson et al., EU Renewable Energy
Support Policy: Faith or Facts?, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 2143, 2144 (2009); Felix Mormann, Re-
quirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903, 937 (2011). See also Alan S.
Miller, Energy Policy from Nixon to Clinton: From Grand Provider to Market Facilitator, 25
ENVTL. L. 715, 729–30 (1995) (warning that the window of opportunity to modernize and
diversify the nation’s power generation technology portfolio is relatively narrow).
276. See, e.g., LAZARD, supra note 223 (comparing the cost of various renewable energy R
technologies).
277. See id. Even a credit multiplier for renewable energy credits awarded for power generated
from these technologies would not change the avoided-cost calculation. Such a multiplier is
aimed at the eligible generator but, by itself, does not require the utility to fulfill its renewa-
ble portfolio standard’s sourcing requirement by purchasing the type of power that the re-
spective generator sells. Absent a specific technology-related carve-out, the renewable
portfolio standard would leave the utility free to fulfill the entirety of its sourcing obligation
by purchasing the least-cost renewable power option. For details on credit multipliers, see
Davies, supra note 44, at 1377. R
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determination of the utility’s avoided cost for that procurement requirement.”278
FERC goes on to explain that “a state may appropriately recognize procure-
ment segmentation by making separate avoided cost calculations.”279 The Com-
mission imposes no limitation on the number of such procurement segments
that a state may recognize, or the number of resulting, distinct avoided cost
calculations. Rather, FERC’s language and reasoning suggest that a renewable
portfolio standard with a sufficiently nuanced sourcing mandate would allow
states to set technology-specific feed-in tariff rates based on a multi-tiered
avoided-cost structure. Such a multi-tiered structure could distinguish not only
between non-renewable and renewable sources but further differentiate among
various renewable energy technologies. In fact, FERC expressly acknowledges
that “[a]voided cost rates may also ‘differentiate among qualifying facilities us-
ing various technologies on the basis of the supply characteristics of the differ-
ent technologies.’ ”280
A technology-specific feed-in tariff policy would ensure that power from
every strand of renewable energy technologies—mature and emerging—is guar-
anteed a rate that will cover the cost of generation and offer a reasonable return
on investment. Based on FERC’s California Public Utilities Commission clarifi-
cation, a state may use its PURPA authority to adopt a technology-specific
feed-in tariff program under two conditions. First, the state would have to
adopt a renewable portfolio standard that not only requires utilities broadly to
source a certain percentage of electricity from renewables but, instead, includes
carve-outs that allocate specified portions of the overall renewables quota to
specific technologies. Second, the state would need to carefully determine its
utilities’ avoided cost for each of the carved-out renewable energy technologies.
The resulting multi-tiered avoided-cost calculus would form the basis of the
state’s technology-specific feed-in tariff. For instance, if a state mandated its
utilities to procure 5% of their electricity from wind and 5% from solar, that
state’s feed-in tariff program could set a multi-tiered rate structure under
PURPA. This structure could account for the difference in production costs not
only between renewables and conventional energy sources but also among dif-
ferent renewable sources of energy, such as solar and wind.
Many states already fulfill the first of the aforementioned two conditions
for implementation of a technology-specific feed-in tariff. In fact, close to two-
thirds of existing state renewable portfolio standards include some form of
carve-out.281 Exactly half of all state portfolio standards feature carve-outs for
solar technology, while about one-fifth incorporate carve-outs for electricity
278. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 133 FERC ¶ 61,059, 61,267 (2010).
279. Id. at 61,268 n.53.
280. See id. at 61,265 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c)(3)(ii) (2010)).
281. Twenty-three out of thirty state RPSs (including the District of Columbia) feature carve-
outs. See Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) with Solar or Distributed Generation Provisions,
DSIRE (2016), http://perma.cc/62CT-ZBV4.
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from wind and/or biomass.282 Together, these numbers illustrate the states’
overwhelming interest in the deployment of a diverse portfolio of renewable
energy technologies that extends beyond the current least-cost options. New
Mexico’s renewable portfolio standard exemplifies this trend: Calling for a 20%
share of renewables by 2020, the state mandates a “fully diversified renewable
energy portfolio” with no less than 6% of electricity to come from wind and at
least 4% to be generated using solar energy.283 Table 1 illustrates the resulting
procurement segmentation.
Segment Non-RE RE Wind RE Solar RE Other RE Rest
% of Mix 80% 6% 4% 1% 9%
RE w/oCoal, Gas, Least-cost“able to sell” Wind only Solar only solar && Nuclear REwind
Table 1: Procurement Segmentation in New Mexico’s Renewable Portfolio Standard
Careful study of existing state renewable portfolio standards offers another
interesting insight with potential relevance for the design of promotionally ef-
fective yet preemption-proof state-level feed-in tariffs: Carve-outs are not nec-
essarily limited to generation technology but can also include other generation
characteristics. One in four state renewable portfolio standards includes a carve-
out for renewable energy projects of a certain size, usually intended to promote
small-scale, distributed generation projects.284 Based on FERC’s reasoning in
California Public Utilities Commission, states are entitled to require “a utility to
procure a certain percentage of energy from generators with certain characteris-
tics” with the effect that only these generators will be considered when calculat-
ing the utility’s avoided cost for said procurement segment.285 In accordance
with FERC’s agnostic choice of words, “certain characteristics” need not neces-
sarily relate to technology but may also be based on size or other characteristics.
As a result, states whose renewable portfolio standards include size-specific
carve-outs may choose to adopt feed-in tariff programs with size-specific
rates.286
282. Id.
283. New Mexico’s renewable portfolio standard further includes a 1% carve-out for “other” re-
newable energy technologies. See N.M. STAT. ANN., § 62-16-4 (2016) and implementing
regulation, N.M. CODE R. §17.9.572.7(G) (LexisNexis 2016).
284. See Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) with Solar or Distributed Generation Provisions,
DSIRE (2016), https://perma.cc/62CT-ZBV4.
285. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 133 FERC ¶ 61,059, 61,267 (2010).
286. This analysis presumes that the state RPS’s carve-outs themselves will pass constitutional
muster. As discussed above, location-based carve-outs would violate the dormant Commerce
Clause while delivery-based, size-based, and other functionally defined carve-outs or re-
quirements would likely be upheld. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.B.3.
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c. Adders and Bonus Payments
FERC’s California Public Utilities Commission orders not only open up a
path for multi-tiered avoided-cost structures, they also offer guidance on the
permissibility and scope of adders or bonus payments to complement the gener-
ation-based portion of a state’s avoided-cost calculations. The Commission be-
gins by reiterating its opposition to adders for broadly construed and
(supposedly) hard-to-quantify environmental externalities.287 FERC proceeds,
however, to highlight that environmental and other costs that—but for
PURPA-mandated procurement from QFs—would represent real, quantifiable
costs to a state’s utilities “may be accounted for in a determination of avoided
cost rates.”288 Such costs may, for instance, include “expected costs of upgrades
to the distribution or transmission system that the QFs will permit the purchas-
ing utility to avoid.”289
FERC’s illustrative example could not be more timely given the growing
trend among states to promote the distributed generation of renewable electric-
ity.290 Adders and bonus payments can help states provide additional incen-
tives—in the form of higher feed-in tariff rates—for distributed generation and
other QFs that offer utilities real, quantifiable cost savings whether they relate
to transmission, distribution, or other drivers of utility costs. In fact, these add-
ers and bonus payments may well be the answer to one commentator’s critique
that “PURPA avoided cost cannot exceed the most economical cost avoided by
the utility finding the best option for this particular type of power from any-
where deliverable to its grid.”291 The underlying concern appears to be that a
state’s PURPA-based feed-in tariff rate may not suffice to promote local de-
ployment of renewable energy technologies if utilities can procure that electric-
ity cheaper elsewhere, say due to better solar resource quality in another state.292
287. See Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 133 FERC at 61,267–68 (citing S. Cal. Edison Co., 71 FERC
¶ 61,269, 62,080 (1995)).
288. Id. at 61,268 (quoting S. Cal. Edison, 71 FERC at ¶ 62,080).
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., California Governor Jerry Brown’s commitment to installing 12,000 MW worth of
distributed generation capacity from renewables. Memorandum from Governor Jerry Brown
on Renewable Energy (Oct. 12, 2011), http://perma.cc/DEN9-VSQM. See also PETER
FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER—CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE FU-
TURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES, 109 (2010) (noting that “capacity planners . . . need to
distinguish between large- and small-scale renewable, or, equivalently, centralized and dis-
tributed generation”). The avoidance of new transmission construction is especially impor-
tant at a time when courts curtail FERC backstop transmission jurisdiction. See Joshua P.
Fershee, Moving Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking Energy Policy Based on a Na-
tional RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 1418 (2010); Mormann, supra note 1, at 1636. R
291. Ferrey, supra note 31, at 115–16. R
292. See ARDANI & MARGOLIS, supra note 175 and accompanying text for the geographic vari- R
ance in renewable energy resource availability.
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Under such circumstances, transmission- and distribution-related adders and
bonus payments could enable a feed-in tariff rate for local QFs that is high
enough to tip the scales in favor of local renewables.
4. Lingering Limitations on States’ Feed-in Tariff Authority
State authority to adopt effective yet preemption-proof feed-in tariffs pur-
suant to FERC’s guidance in California Public Utilities Commission is subject to
two caveats. The first stems from lingering uncertainty over judicial approval of
the Commission’s interpretation of PURPA’s avoided cost mandate. After all,
FERC’s statutory construction in California Public Utilities Commission is sub-
ject to judicial review. Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, reveal a sub-
stantial degree of judicial deference and self-restraint in favor of the
Commission’s decisions related to federal preemption and other jurisdictional
questions.293
The second caveat relates to PURPA’s definition of renewable energy
QFs.  PURPA limits state authority over wholesale rates for renewable energy
QFs to generators whose nameplate capacity does not exceed 80MW.294 Ac-
cordingly, state efforts to promote larger-scale renewable power generation
through feed-in tariff policies remain subject to federal preemption, even after
California Public Utilities Commission.295 In fact, state jurisdiction over wholesale
rates for QFs of 80MW or less has been further diluted since the Energy Policy
Act of 2005.296
Among other things, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized FERC to
exempt an electric utility from its PURPA obligations vis-a`-vis QFs whose
nameplate capacity exceeds 20MW if these QFs are found to have undiscrimi-
natory access to a qualified sales platform for their electricity.297 The Act pro-
vides that this access requirement is fulfilled in any one of the following three
circumstances: (i) “access to an independently administered, auction-based day
ahead and real-time wholesale market for the sale of electric energy and access
to wholesale markets for long-term sales of capacity and electric energy,”298 (ii)
access to transmission and interconnection services by a FERC-approved re-
293. See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298 (2016); Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016); New York v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 23 (2002). See also Rossi, supra note 206, at 59 R
(suggesting that recent Supreme Court precedent points toward agency, rather than judicial
determinations of preemption and other jurisdictional questions).
294. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.204 (2016).
295. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
296. Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 109-58 (2005).
297. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(m) (2012). See also 18 C.F.R. § 292.309 (2016) (implementing the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 through FERC regulation).
298. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(m)(1)(A).
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gional transmission entity and to competitive wholesale markets offering a
meaningful opportunity to sell capacity through long-term, short-term and
real-time sales to buyers other than the QF’s local utility,299 and (iii) access to
wholesale markets for the sale of electricity that are at least of competitive qual-
ity comparable to the previous two.300
If the qualified access requirement is met, a utility can seek exemption
from its PURPA purchase obligation vis-a`-vis QFs whose nameplate capacity
exceeds 20MW.301 In fact, FERC has created rebuttable presumptions in favor
of the qualified access requirements and, in practice, exempts utilities on a fairly
regular basis.302 Once FERC grants the exemption, states no longer have juris-
diction to require the exempt utility to purchase power from QFs greater than
20MW, let alone at a feed-in tariff rate that is high enough to cover the gener-
ator’s cost and offer a reasonable return on investment. Rather, the then appli-
cable FPA vests the authority to set wholesale rates exclusively with FERC and
would render any conflicting state feed-in tariff subject to federal preemption
under the Supremacy Clause.303 According to one commentator, standard pre-
emption analysis would “entirely eviscerate state efforts to adopt non-market-
based feed-in tariffs for larger scale renewable projects.”304 In practice, states’
PURPA authority to adopt promotionally effective yet preemption-proof feed-
in tariffs is therefore limited to smaller-scale projects of 20MW or less.305
Idaho’s recent wind disaggregation controversy aptly illustrates the critical
value that developers assign to the difference between state-mandated avoided
cost rates under PURPA and the less generous rates for larger, PURPA-exempt
facilities.306 Several large-scale wind projects in Idaho had artificially disaggre-
gated into clusters of smaller projects in order to qualify for state’s more gener-
ous PURPA rates. According to the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, the
difference between the two rates made disaggregation so appealing that “any
attempt to implement criteria in an effort to prevent disaggregation would be
met by attempts to circumvent such criteria.”307 Nonetheless, the Commission
went on to clarify that “it would be erroneous, and illegal pursuant to PURPA,
for this Commission to allow large projects to obtain a rate that is not an accu-
299. See id. § 824a-3(m)(1)(B).
300. See id. § 824a-3(m)(1)(C).
301. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.310(d).
302. See id. § 292.309(e), (f), (g).
303. See supra Parts III.A, III.B. See also Rossi, supra note 31, at 253. R
304. Id.
305. Only in Hawaii, Alaska, and the portion of Texas served by the Electric Reliability Council
of Texas would, in the absence of FERC authority over wholesale rates, states retain author-
ity to adopt state feed-in tariffs for renewable power generators of 20MW and more.
306. See Idaho Pub. Util. Comm’n. Order No. 32697 (Dec. 18, 2012).
307. Id. at 3.
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rate reflection of the utility’s avoided cost for the purchase of the QF
generation.”308
IV. WHEN ONE PLUS ONE IS LESS THAN TWO: COMBINING
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS AND FEED-IN TARIFFS
FOR RECIPROCAL REDUCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RISK
In California Public Utilities Commission, FERC did more than just open
up a path for state feed-in tariffs that effectively promote renewables without
risking preemption under the Supremacy Clause. The Commission gave states
the blueprint for a policy strategy that can internalize most, if not all, of the
economic benefits associated with renewable energy—without running afoul of
the Commerce Clause. The key, remarkably, lies in the proper combination of
renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs. By itself, each policy exhibits
distinct vulnerabilities to constitutional challenges as it seeks to promote both
renewable energy deployment and in-state economic development. A
standalone state feed-in tariff with rates high enough to cover the cost of dis-
tributed solar and other emerging renewable power generators would not sur-
vive a Supremacy Clause challenge due to preemption by the FPA.309 A
standalone state renewable portfolio standard that uses location-based require-
ments and preferences to capture associated economic benefits in-state would,
due to its facially discriminatory features, be held to violate the dormant Com-
merce Clause.310 Simple arithmetic suggests that combining two policies that
each carry significant constitutional risks would also aggregate those risks.
Hence, a two-legged regime, combining renewable portfolio standard and feed-
in tariff, that seeks both to offer promotionally effective rates to renewable gen-
erators and to internalize the associated economic benefits should be at elevated
risk of running afoul both the Supremacy Clause and the dormant Commerce
Clause. And, yet, the opposite holds true. Combined implementation of state
renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs creates an overall lower consti-
tutional risk profile reducing the state’s aggregate exposure to constitutional
challenges.
In the preceding section, I have explained how state renewable portfolio
standards, especially when combined with a system of carve-outs, enable policy-
makers to implement feed-in tariff programs that pay clean energy entrepre-
neurs more than the going rate for electricity generated from coal or natural
gas—without preemption under the Supremacy Clause.311 Feed-in tariffs recip-
rocate renewable portfolio standards’ shield function against constitutional
challenges by offering policymakers a constitutionally safe way of ensuring that
308. Id. at 4 (citing Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm’n, 917 P.2d 766, 780 (Idaho
1996)).
309. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
310. See supra Part II.B.2.
311. See supra Part III.B.3.
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most, if not all, of the job creation, tax revenue, and other economic benefits of
renewable energy accrue within the state. A state-level feed-in tariff’s intercon-
nection mandate and purchase requirement are binding only upon electric utili-
ties operating inside the state’s boundaries.312 As feed-in tariff programs require
local utilities to grant incoming renewable power generators grid access, they
create a quasi-delivery requirement, such as those a state renewable portfolio
standard might employ to capture some economic benefits. When these inter-
connections, as is common for QF generators, occur at the distribution-system
level,313 their practical effect resembles that of the in-state generation require-
ments that would be constitutionally impermissible under a state renewable
portfolio standard.314 Due to their definition along functional, as opposed to
location-based terms, not to mention their express authorization by PURPA,315
these features do not create the same constitutional vulnerability for a state
feed-in tariff that they would trigger for a state renewable portfolio standard,
while keeping critical economic benefits associated with renewable energy de-
ployment in-state.
V. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR STATE
LEADERSHIP IN CLIMATE AND CLEAN ENERGY POLICY
The idea of combining renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs to
enable states to be leaders in climate and clean energy policy may be elegant but
is also imperfect. Its elegance lies in the simplicity, by which this joint policy
regime honors the anti-protectionist and pro-competitive spirit of modern dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine while nevertheless allowing states to capture
many of the economic benefits of climate-friendly renewables. These benefits
are key to rewarding and, thereby, incentivizing state policy leadership in cli-
mate change mitigation. Along the way, states serve as policy incubators and
motors of diversity, or, borrowing from the time-honored Brandeisian ideal, as
laboratories of democracy and sustainability.316 Notwithstanding its conceptual
elegance, the proposed solution suffers from imperfections in terms of the un-
derlying policy tools as well as their locus of implementation.
For the purpose of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate anthro-
pogenic climate change, renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs are
both second-best policy options. Economists have long suggested that pricing
312. A state FIT program with a broader reach would no longer be covered by PURPA and also
violate the extraterritoriality principle of the dormant Commerce Clause. See supra notes
80–81 and accompanying text. R
313. See New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 31 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (explaining the interplay between high-voltage transmission and lower-voltage
distribution lines).
314. See supra Part II.B.2.
315. See supra Part III.2.
316. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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greenhouse gas emissions, in the form of a carbon tax317 or cap-and-trade re-
gime,318 is, in theory at least, the single most efficient policy to mitigate climate
change and promote abatement technologies, such as solar, wind, and other
low-carbon renewables.319 A price on greenhouse gas emissions would require
producers to internalize the cost of their emissions and thereby penalize pollu-
tion and encourage abatement. Over time, this direct, static effect would be
complemented by an indirect, dynamic effect of encouraging the refinement of
existing and development of new abatement technologies.320 From an efficiency
perspective, a tax on greenhouse gas emissions or a cap-and-trade scheme
would incur lower opportunity costs than direct support for these technologies,
including that afforded by a feed-in tariff or renewable portfolio standard.321
From an institutional perspective, the state-centricity of the proposed so-
lution may raise concerns over the locus of implementation for policies aiming
to promote clean energy and mitigate global climate change. The literature is
only just beginning to engage with the institutional questions surrounding the
implementation of feed-in tariffs in the United States. Recent scholarship,
however, makes the case that existing regulatory authority and the greater abil-
ity to account for local needs and opportunities point to the state, rather than
federal forum for implementation of feed-in tariffs.322 The literature on renewa-
ble portfolio standards, meanwhile, has hotly debated the subject for some time.
Those who argue for implementation at the federal level point to the better fit
with the inter-state nature of the U.S. electricity grid,323 efficiency gains from a
unified, national market for trading RECs,324 and the reduced risk of regulatory
leakage.325 Proponents of state-level renewable portfolio standards, on the other
317. See, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009).
318. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complimen-
tary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207 (2012).
319. See, e.g., Finon, supra note 52, at 112; Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: R
Technology and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165, 169 (2005); Atanas
Kolev & Armin Riess, Environmental and Technology Externalities: Policy and Investment
Implications, 12 EIB PAPERS 134, 140 (2007); STERN, supra note 275, at 35, 348. R
320. See Kolev & Riess, supra note 319, at 137 (discussing the impact of environmental policy on R
technological change).
321. See Mormann, supra note 275, at 929. R
322. See Mormann, supra note 1, at 1680. R
323. See, e.g., Shelley Welton, From the States Up: Building a National Renewable Energy Policy, 17
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 987, 998 (2009) (describing that state-level renewable portfolio stan-
dards are considered “physically at odds” with the interstate transmission system).
324. See, e.g., Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong: The Case for a
National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for Policy, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. &
POL’Y J. 85, 105 (2008) (critiquing the volatility of trading prices due to the multiplicity of
fragmented state markets for renewable energy credits).
325. See, e.g., Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or Mis-
guided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79, 107 (2008) (warning that the heterogeneity of state
renewable portfolio standards might be evidence of a “race to the bottom” where state gov-
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hand, argue that existing state policy activism displaces the need for federal
action,326 states are better positioned to account for local renewable resources,327
and have historically been tasked with determining their own energy
portfolios.328
Whatever the merits of either side’s arguments,329 the proposed solution
does not preclude the adoption of a federal renewable portfolio standard in
the—however distant330—future. According to FERC’s reasoning in California
Public Utilities Commission, a state or federal renewable portfolio standard alike
could provide the procurement segmentation necessary to facilitate the adop-
tion of effective, yet preemption-proof state feed-in tariffs based on a multi-
tiered avoided-cost calculus.331
From a practical perspective, one may wonder whether it makes economic
sense for a northern state with limited solar resources such as New Jersey to be a
contender for the distinction of “solar capital of the nation.”332 Whatever is
driving the Garden State’s commitment to solar energy—be it environmental or
economic motives, or a combination of the two—the political accountability of
its policymakers suggests that a majority of New Jersey’s electorate supports the
push for solar.
Meanwhile, recent events in previously solar-friendly Nevada, where the
state’s Public Utilities Commission slashed incentives for new and existing
rooftop solar installations, illustrate how quickly the political pendulum can
ernments compete for economic activity by producing regulations which fail to satisfy the
public interest).
326. See, e.g., Ralls, supra note 38, at 451 (maintaining that “[a]ctivities on a number of fronts R
supplant the need for a federal RPS”).
327. See, e.g., Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L. J. 49, 59 (2008)
(laying out the argument that a federal renewable portfolio standard would lead to significant
transfers of wealth from states with scarce renewable energy resources to states with an abun-
dance of renewables).
328. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Power Future, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 261, 284 (2005)
(pointing to the states’ historical role as drivers of energy policy).
329. See Mormann, supra note 1, at 1680–81 (suggesting that the benefits of a nationwide market R
for renewable energy credits point to the federal forum as the preferred locus of implementa-
tion for renewable portfolio standards).
330. If recent Congressional history is any indication, the adoption of a federal renewable portfo-
lio standard appears unlikely in the foreseeable future. See Davies, supra note 44, at 1341 R
(reporting over two dozen failed proposals for a federal renewable portfolio standard).
331. Recent scholarship has made the case for integrated use of a state feed-in tariff and a state or
federal renewable portfolio standard to better mitigate investor and regulatory risk. See
Mormann, supra note 1, at 1659. R
332. New Jersey, A New Solar Energy Capital, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Mar. 26, 2004),
https://perma.cc/4Q8V-JP5F. See also Lauren Craig, Solar Capital? It Could Be Vineland, NJ,
EARTH TECHLING (Nov. 20, 2011), https://perma.cc/4S8Z-FPEH.
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swing back.333 Such political volatility and the resulting policy uncertainty334
may be inevitable and a price worth paying for the state forum’s proven ability
to overcome the collective action problems that continue to hinder Congres-
sional action in the context of climate and clean energy policy.335 The proposed
combination of renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs to facilitate
continuing state policy leadership in this space is, after all, an imperfect solution
for an imperfect world.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of decisive Congressional action to combat climate change
and promote low-carbon renewable energy, more and more states are stepping
in to fill the climate policy void. The proliferation of state renewable portfolio
standards suggests that a majority of states are prepared to give their neighbors,
and the world at large, a free ride in terms of the environmental benefits of
their policy activism. Yet, when it comes to the job creation, tax revenue, and
other economic benefits of clean energy deployment, states are less willing to
share, as indicated by the prevalence of in-state requirements and preferences
among state renewable portfolio standards. With their facial discrimination,
these requirements and preferences violate the Constitution’s dormant Com-
merce Clause, placing critical policy momentum for global climate change miti-
gation and a cleaner energy economy at risk.
Feed-in tariffs, such as those recently adopted by a growing number of
pioneering states, allow states to capture most of the economic benefits of their
commitment to renewables without running afoul of the dormant Commerce
Clause. But state feed-in tariff programs raise issues under the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause due to their possible preemption by the FPA. This apparent
dilemma has prompted a number of scholars to call for reform of existing Com-
merce Clause doctrine and Congressional action to expressly authorize discrim-
inatory state renewable portfolio standards and state feed-in tariffs.
Pushing back against the prevailing scholarly pessimism and recognizing
the improbability of proposed reforms, this Article makes the case that states
can advance global environmental and local economic interests alike by com-
bining renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs. In its recent, largely
overlooked California Public Utilities Commission decision, FERC has given
333. See Decisions and Orders, Docket 2015-07041, Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Nev. (2016). See also
New Metering Rates and Rules, PUB. UTILS. COMM’N OF NEV. https://perma.cc/YC5S-
FGVB.
334. See Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L. 681,
705–06 (2012) (noting the critical importance of policy certainty to leverage private-sector
investment).
335. See supra note 330; see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: R
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
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state policymakers a blueprint for joint implementation of both policies in a
way that reduces, rather than exacerbates, the overall risk of constitutional chal-
lenges to the state’s policy commitment to climate change mitigation and a
cleaner energy economy. The proper combination of both policies proves mutu-
ally beneficial as renewable portfolio standards shield promotionally effective
state feed-in tariffs from preemption by the FPA while the states’ geographi-
cally limited tariff-setting authority under PURPA ensures that most of the
economic benefits associated with their commitment to clean energy are cap-
tured in-state.
